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Abstract
Nearly 20 employees are killed and 20,000 injured in the United States each day, with a
contributing cause in nearly all being unsafe behavior. Unsafe behaviors are the result of
a negative organizational safety culture, which includes the attitudes and beliefs toward
safety transmitted from executives and front-line leaders to shop floor employees. While
previous research indicated that front-line leaders have great impact on employee’s
perception of safety culture, how executives impact the development of safety culture
was less understood. The theory of planned behavior and social exchange theory were
used in this descriptive phenomenological research study to address the research question
associated with the lived experience of safety professionals observing the development of
safety culture in their organization, as impacted by the interventions of executives.
Participants were purposefully selected based on criteria for professional experience, time
with their current organization, and their affiliation with professional safety
organizations. Semistructured interviews were conducted, transcripts created, and handcoding was employed to identify trends in responses. Emergent themes identified the
most impactful methods employed by executives to drive the development of a positive
safety culture; engagement, trust, ownership, and integration. The social change that this
research can drive is an improvement in safety culture, leading to an increase in safe
behaviors and a reduction in occupational deaths and injuries. The practical application
of this study to the safety profession is to help guide executives on the most appropriate
actions to take to improve safety culture and injury reduction in their organization
through the demonstration of engagement, trust, ownership and integration.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Nearly 5,000 employees die each year in the United States as the result of
occupational injury. Approximately 88% of occupational injuries are associated with
unsafe behaviors which are a result of the safety culture that has developed within the
organization through the interactions, messages and expectations of the organization. It
has long been identified that management plays a role in the development of safety
culture. The most consistent demonstration of safety culture comes from the relationship
with an employee’s direct manager (Kozlowski & Doherty, 1989). However,
organizations struggle with ensuring that the safety culture of the executive leadership
team is conveyed to shop for employees through their front-line supervisor (Antonsen,
2009). This is vital, as senior managers set the tone for safety culture within their
organizations (Pilbeam, Doherty, Davidson, & Denyer, 2016). Research into the
interventions employed by management to improve safety culture is necessary
(Bronkhorst, Tummers, & Steijn, 2018).
I investigated the interventions employed by executive leaders in organizations, as
perceived by safety professionals supporting the organization, in order to identify
effective interventions for developing a positive organizational safety culture. Through
this research, I identified effective interventions that can be employed by executives in
order to build a positive safety culture for their organization, reduce unsafe behaviors and
reduce occupational injury and death, resulting in improvements for employees and the
general economy.
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This chapter will include a brief summary of existing literature on the topic, the
gap that my proposed study addressed, the research problem, the purpose of the study,
research questions. The chapter will also include the theoretical framework for the study,
the rationale for the design of the study and the methodology to be employed, definitions,
assumptions, the scope of the study, transferability, limitations, professional application
of the research and the positive social change that it may drive.
Background of the Study
Historical research and current research continue to reinforce that a contributing
cause in nearly all occupational injuries is unsafe behavior (Goh, Ubeynarayana, Wong,
& Guo, 2018). In many cases, this unsafe behavior is noncompliance with safety
procedures (Dahl & Olsen, 2013). Employee safety behavior is influenced by an
organization's safety culture, which is based on the organization's values and beliefs
regarding safety (Choudhry, Fang, & Mohamed, 2007) and exhibited in the behaviors of
employees (Brettel, Chomik, & Flatten, 2015). If safety is perceived as a value by
management and upheld, employees will reduce unsafe behaviors and perform work with
safety in mind, reducing injuries (Zacharatos, Barling, & Iverson, 2005).
The relationship between the front-line employee and their direct supervisor
drives employee behaviors (Kapp, 2012). Supervisors who place greater value on safety
experience greater compliance, while those who place lower value on safety experience
lower levels of compliance (Kapp, 2012). Pilbeam et al. (2016) found that the
relationship between the front-line supervisor and his/her direct reports has been studied,
while other leadership relationships, such as senior managers, that set the tone for safety
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culture within their organizations, need to be investigated. Where studies on senior
managers and their commitment to safety culture have been conducted, limitations still
exist. Fruhen, Mearns, Flin, and Kirwan (2014) conducted a study after previous
research indicated that senior leaders had significant influence on safety culture but did
not explain which characteristics of the senior leader had the greatest effect. Fruhen et al.
(2014) indicated characteristics of senior leaders that were key to influencing safety
among air traffic management companies. Transferability was limited in this study
because the study indicated attributes, not specific actions that were most beneficial at
improving safety culture. Biggs, Banks, Davey, and Freeman (2013) found that
leadership and visibility of senior leaders was the primary, effective means to
implementing a positive safety culture in the Australian construction industry. This study
showed the need for additional research to determine if the findings were applicable
outside of Australia and outside of the construction industry.
In addition to addressing the issues of transferability and generalizability
associated with previous studies, future research is needed to address limitations or
recommendations from previous research. One such application of a recommendation
includes the review of the attitude and commitment of the senior leader as observed by
their organization’s safety professional. This is in alignment with Fruhen et al. (2014),
who suggested researching the perception of safety culture through the views of other
employees in the organizational hierarchy. Bronkhorst et al. (2018) indicated significant
improvement in the perception of senior management priority of safety after conducting
walk arounds on the shop floor. However, the study was unable to identify which
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intervention at which hierarchical level had the greatest effect on safety culture
improvement. "Future studies could try to develop intervention studies using various
treatment arms to disentangle individual effects and fruitful combinations." (Bronkhorst
et al., 2018, p.28).
Recommendations for future research also originated from the Gravina,
Cummins, and Austin (2017) study and the Engemann and Scott (2018) study. These
studies showed that senior leaders have been found to use dynamic or on the fly
leadership methods (Gravina et al., 2017), which raise concerns about leaders’
interventions on safety culture and the implications of those interventions on safety
behaviors and work-related accidents (Engemann & Scott, 2018). Bronkhorst et al.
(2018) also identified a limitation of the study that there was no qualitative data collected
on the interventions to understand the why and the how of the effectiveness of the
intervention, which was addressed in this research.
In this study, I addressed the recommendations of Engemann and Scott (2018),
Bronkhorst et al. (2018), Gravina et al. (2017) and Fruhen et al. (2014) as well as address
the generalizability issues associated with the Fruhen et al. (2014) and the Biggs et al.
(2013) studies. I examined which characteristics, at the senior manager organizational
levels, have been observed by the organization’s safety professional as having the
greatest impact on the development of safety culture. The research is necessary to
address recommendations and limitations in previous studies in order to improve
employee safety behaviors through the development of a positive safety culture, reducing
occupational death and injury.
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Problem Statement
Each year United States occupational accidents result in the death of more than
4,600 individuals and the serious injury of nearly 5 million more (Hofmann, Burke, &
Zohar, 2017). These injuries result in hardships to the family of the employee and to the
economy as nearly $50 billion dollars is spent on direct medical costs alone (MarucciWellman et al., 2015). The general problem is that a contributing cause in nearly 88% of
occupational incidents is unsafe behavior (Goh et al., 2018) affected by the attitudes and
beliefs toward safety due to a lack of management commitment to maintaining a positive
safety culture (Zhang et al., 2018). Conversely, if safety is perceived as a value by
management and upheld, employees will perform work with safety in mind, reducing
injuries (Zacharatos et al., 2005).
The specific management problem is that when executives use dynamic or on the
fly leadership methods (Gravina et al., 2017), concerns are raised about leaders’
interventions on safety culture and the implications of those interventions on safety
behaviors and work-related accidents (Engemann & Scott, 2018). Bronkhorst et al.
(2018) identified the need for a study of interventions employed by management to
improve safety culture.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this qualitative descriptive phenomenological research study was
to describe the effectiveness of executive interventions on the safety culture within their
organizations, as perceived by safety professionals. A greater understanding of how
safety professionals perceive executive interventions, such as words, actions, or voice,
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may allow for improved development of training. The training could encourage
executives to practice interventions that foster a positive safety culture that reduces
occupational death and injury. I asked safety professionals to describe the interventions
that have been employed by executives in their organization and their perception of the
effectiveness of such interventions on the safety culture and voice of the organization.
My intent was to capture the lived experience of the safety professionals, as identified by
Giorgi (2009).
Research Questions
The purpose of this descriptive phenomenological research study was to describe
the effectiveness of executive interventions on the safety culture within their
organizations, as perceived by safety professionals. The central research question (RQ)
was:
RQ: What are the lived experiences of safety professionals observing the
development of safety culture in their organization as impacted by the interventions of
executives?
Theoretical Foundation
I situated this study between the gaps identified by Pilbeam et al. (2016) and
Fruhen et al. (2013) by describing the lived experience of the safety professional as safety
culture develops through executive interventions within the organization. I analyzed the
artifacts of culture through the lived experiences of organizational insiders, to make
deciphering the artifacts possible, as explained by Schein (1990).
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The framework for this study draws upon the theory of planned behavior and
social exchange theory. Ajzen (1991), using his theory of planned behavior, suggested
that employee behavior is based on the norms accepted by significant individuals in the
organization, which includes managers. Montano and Kasprzyk (2015) proposed the use
of the theory of planned behavior in conjunction with the theory of planned action in
order to consider accepted norms as well as attitudes, behaviors and feelings of control.
These theories are applicable to safety culture as employee safety attitude and behavior
have been found to be influenced by an organization's safety culture, which is based on
the employee beliefs and attitude toward safety (Choudhry et al., 2007).
Social exchange theory indicates that if employees perceive that the company is
concerned with their wellbeing, employees will work to benefit the company (Blau,
1964). When applying social exchange theory to occupational safety, the theory suggests
that if safety is seen as a concern, employees will comply with safety requirements, with
exchanges influencing safety culture as described by Reader, Mearns, Lopes, and Kuha
(2017). This is echoed by Zacharatos et al. (2005), who found that if safety is perceived
as a value by management and upheld, employees will perform work with safety in mind.
In Chapter 2, I will provide additional details about the framework that I used in
this research. This will include the applicability to safety culture, and how I conducted
the study in alignment with the framework.
Nature of the Study
The purpose of the qualitative, descriptive phenomenological study was to
describe executive effectiveness in influencing the safety culture within their
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organizations, as perceived by safety professionals. Qualitative research is in alignment
with Antonsen (2009), who confirmed previous research suggesting that qualitative
analysis of a safety culture may be more appropriate than quantitative analysis. To
understand the perception of cultural interventions at executive levels of organizations, I
interviewed safety professionals at various organizations. I used safety professionals as
part of the research to address recommendations highlighted by previous research
indicating that executives may, when questioned, respond in a manner which indicates
that they exhibit the expected level of safety engagement, as indicated by Flin (2003).
The safety professional, on the other hand, has unique access to executive level
employees, shop floor employees and all management levels in between and has training,
experience, and education to understand safety culture and implications. Based on
experiences, safety professionals are uniquely positioned to describe their perceptions of
effectiveness of leader interventions on the safety culture of the organization. This is also
in alignment with Schein (1990), who expressed the struggle to decipher artifacts of
culture without an insider’s perspective. In this study, the safety professional is the
insider.
I asked the participants to participate in interviews consisting of open-ended
questions. I designed these questions to elicit the safety professional’s perception of the
effectiveness of interventions employed by executive levels of management on improving
the safety culture. The names of the organizations that the safety professional
participants represent remained anonymous; as this information was not collected and
was redacted from the transcript if unintentionally provided by the participant.
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My use of the phenomenological research method in the study is similar to other
phenomenological research conducted to understand the feelings and experiences of
others, within the realm of occupational health and safety. Høivik, Moen, Mearns, and
Haukelid (2009) conducted a phenomenological study on the phenomenon of safety
culture to produce a description of safety culture at one facility. Chikudate (2009)
conducted a phenomenological study to describe the experiences of Japanese train
companies and post incident learnings. Burgoyne and Hodgson (1983) conducted
phenomenological research on learnings of management based on their experiences in the
workplace. Catlette (2005) conducted a phenomenological study on the lived experience
of workplace violence survivors, including their fears, actions within the workplace and
recommended safety improvements.
Following the interview of participants, I analyzed the data by first creating a
written transcript. From the transcript, coding occurred to identify themes in the
responses of participants. The themes have been reported from the research.
Definitions
Safety Commitment: Kark, Katz-Navon and Delegach (2015) define safety
commitment as the desire to invest in safety as well as the personal values of safety in the
workplace. An employee who is committed to a culture of safety follows the rules for
safety and speaks to peers about working safely because he/she is committed to the goal
of reducing injuries.
Safety Culture: Hofmann et al. (2017) defines safety cultures as time-tested values
and expectations of the organization. These values are rewarded. An example of a poor
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safety culture might be when employees continually see production valued over safety.
An example of a positive safety culture might be when employees see pauses in
production to execute a needed safety improvement, designed to prevent injury.
Safety Intervention: Hofmann et al. (2017) defines safety intervention as
tasks/activities that are implemented in a social system. These tasks/actions may have a
positive or negative influence on the safety culture.
Unsafe Behavior: Li, Lv, Zhu, and Sheng (2018) define unsafe behavior as an
action taken by an employee that is without regard to direction, rules, procedures,
training, etc.
Assumptions
One of my assumptions for this study was associated with the ability to obtain
data saturation through solicitation of research participants by use of only one
professional safety organization. I selected this organization as I believed it provided
access to participants who met the inclusion criteria. However, as I could not reach data
saturation by working through one organization, it was necessary to identify another
method of identifying participants while also ensuring the inclusion criteria of safety
professionals who participated in the research.
Additional assumptions were associated with the participants and the collection of
data. I assumed that the questions that I selected for the interview were the most
appropriate questions to address the research question. I also assumed that participants
would provide honest responses to interview questions and that they are knowledgeable
in the field to respond to such questions.
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Scope and Delimitations
The specific management problem is that some executives use dynamic or on the
fly leadership methods (Gravina et al., 2017), which raises concerns about leaders’
interventions on safety culture and the implications of those interventions on safety
behaviors and work-related accidents (Engemann & Scott, 2018). Since Bronkhorst et al.
(2018) identified the need for a study of interventions employed by management to
improve safety culture, I focused on the effectiveness of executive interventions on
influencing a positive safety culture, reducing unsafe behaviors and increasing safety
performance.
I conducted interviews with safety professionals, who have a minimum standard
of education and experience. The minimum standard of education was a bachelor’s
degree in safety, environmental, or engineering field; at least 5 years of experience in the
field of occupational safety; and at least 2 years of experience within the organization in
which they will describe their experiences. Participants who were no longer employed by
the organization that they would describe were not be included in the research, as it was
possible that their employment status may have resulted in additional bias.
I conducted interviews with safety professionals from the United States
representing many different types of organizations (private and public, high and low
hazard) in different sectors (service industry, manufacturing, healthcare, etc.), in order to
fill a research gap indicated by Fruhen et al. (2013). I collected data in the form of
individual interviews, allowing the participant to describe the interventions employed by
executives within the organization and their perceptions of those interventions. I
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conducted the interviews with safety professionals supporting organizations, in order to
provide a perspective from individuals who understand the importance of safety, how to
identify concerns, and how to correct hazards.
Limitations
A limitation to the study is the transferability of the study outside of the research
population. There are generalities that apply; however, the study shows what was
determined to be most effective safety interventions implemented by the leaders of the
organizations represented by the research participants. In order to determine applicability
outside of the research participants, I have included the context of the research in detail.
This will allow readers to determine applicability outside of the research population and
will also assist in ensuring dependability of the study.
Another limitation of the study is the knowledge of participants and their ability
to gauge the intent of leaders within their organization. In order to minimize this
potential limitation, each participant holds a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in safety,
environmental or engineering field, at least 5 years of experience in the field of
occupational safety, and at least 2 years of experience within the organization in which
they will describe their experiences.
Significance of the Study
This study is unique in that I addressed an under-researched area of the safety
profession. This includes the development of safety culture at the senior management
level within the organization as indicated by Pilbeam et al. (2016) and across different
types of organizations as indicated by Fruhen et al. (2013), all with the intent of reducing
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death and injury by creating a positive safety culture. A positive safety culture reduces
death and injury within an organization (Neal & Griffin, 2006) and influences positive
social change through reductions in the loss of life and loss of financial resources
(Marucci-Wellman et al., 2015).
Significance to Practice
The practical application of this study to the safety profession may be to help
develop training and guidance on actions for senior managers to develop a systematic
approach to fostering a positive safety culture. These actions may improve safety culture
and reduce unsafe acts. Ultimately, this can result in improved safety performance.
Significance to Theory
Executives influence safety culture through their words and deeds, or their
interventions. The outcome of this study may produce a better understanding of the
words and actions, or voice, used by executives to effectively influence safety culture
regardless of the heuristic and dynamic method employed. The study may also help to
identify additional applications of the theory of planned behavior and social exchange
theory, as applicable to the development of safety culture.
Significance to Social Change
The social change that this research may drive is an improvement in safety
culture, leading to a reduction in occupational death and injuries. This improvement can
be brought about by understanding how safety culture cascades through an organization
through the specific actions of the senior manager to the shop floor employee, then
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developing a plan to for executive interventions in alignment with the interventions most
effective at fostering a positive safety culture.
Summary and Transition
Each year, United States’ occupational accidents result in the death of more than
4,600 individuals and the serious injury of nearly five million more (Hofmann et al.,
2017). These injuries result in hardships to the family of the employee and to the
economy as nearly $50 billion dollars is spent on direct medical costs alone (MarucciWellman et al., 2015). The general problem is that a contributing cause in nearly 88% of
occupational incidents is unsafe behavior (Goh et al., 2018) affected by the attitudes and
beliefs toward safety due to a lack of management commitment to maintaining a positive
safety culture (Zhang et al., 2018).
The specific management problem is that executives use dynamic or on the fly
leadership methods (Gravina et al., 2017), which raises concerns about leaders’
interventions on safety culture and the implications of those interventions on safety
behaviors and work related accidents (Engemann & Scott, 2018). Bronkhorst et al.
(2018) identified the need for a study of interventions employed by management to
improve safety culture.
In Chapter 2, I will show how this descriptive phenomenological research study
on safety professional perceptions of the effectiveness of the influence of executive
interventions on the safety culture within their organizations fits into the literature gap.
This may ultimately lead to a greater understanding of how safety professionals perceive
interventions, the words and actions or voice, of executives may allow for the
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development of training. The training could encourage executives to practice
interventions that foster a positive safety culture that reduces occupational death and
injury.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Each year United States’ occupational accidents result in the death of more than
4,600 individuals and the serious injury of nearly five million more (Hofmann, Burke, &
Zohar, 2017). These injuries result in hardships to the family of the employee and to the
economy, as nearly $50 billion dollars is spent on direct medical costs alone (MarucciWellman et al., 2015). The general problem is that a contributing cause in nearly 88%
occupational incidents is unsafe behavior (Goh et al., 2018), which is affected by the
attitudes and beliefs toward safety due to a lack of management commitment to
maintaining a positive safety culture (Zhang et al., 2018). Conversely, if safety is
perceived as a value by management and upheld, employees will perform work with
safety in mind, reducing injuries (Zacharatos et al., 2005).
The specific management problem is that executives use dynamic or on the fly
leadership methods (Gravina et al., 2017), which raises concerns about leaders’
interventions on safety culture and the implications of those interventions on safety
behaviors and work-related accidents (Engemann & Scott, 2018). Bronkhorst et al.
(2018) identified the need for a study of interventions employed by management to
improve safety culture.
The purpose of this descriptive phenomenological research study was to describe
the effectiveness of the influence of executive interventions on the safety culture within
their organizations, as perceived by safety professionals. A greater understanding of how
safety professionals perceive interventions; the words and actions or voice, of executives
may allow for the development of training. The training could encourage executives to
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practice interventions that foster a positive safety culture that reduces occupational death
and injury. I asked safety professionals to describe the interventions that have been
employed by executives in their organization and their perception of the effectiveness of
such interventions on the safety culture and voice of the organization. I intended to
capture the lived experience of the safety professionals as suggested by Giorgi (2009).
Literature Search Strategy
The purpose of this literature review is to provide a history of safety management
and effective influence on safety culture and safety performance. Reviewing existing
research identified a gap in literature that my research may address; the interventions of
executives that result in the greatest improvement to safety culture and performance.
I conducted at search within the Walden Library for resources in the following
databases: Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost, ProQuest, ScienceDirect. Google
Scholar was also utilized to access literature.
Key terms or key phrases included the following: safety culture, safety
performance, safe behavior, occupational death, management support for safety,
executive support for safety, safety professional impact safe behavior, safety professional
impact safety performance, theory of planned behavior, theory of planned management,
transformational leadership, transactional leadership, phenomenological research, and
multifaceted intervention (intervention at various levels of the organization).
I combined key terms to further investigate the relationship between terms. These
terms included: front-line leadership/safety culture, safety culture/safety performance,
safe behavior/manager, occupational death/injury, occupational injury/management,
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transformational leadership/safety, transactional leadership/safety,
phenomenological/safety, phenomenological/management, phenomenological/research,
and multifaceted intervention/safety.
Theoretical Foundation
I situated this study between the gaps identified by Pilbeam et al. (2016) and
Fruhen et al. (2013) by describing the lived experience of the safety professional as safety
culture develops within the organization. I analyzed the artifacts of culture through the
lived experiences of organizational insiders, to make deciphering the artifacts possible, as
explained by Schein (1990).
I selected the framework for this study to draw upon the theory of planned
behavior and social exchange theory. Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behavior,
suggests that employee behavior is based on the norms accepted by significant
individuals in the organization, which includes managers. Montano and Kasprzyk (2015)
proposed the use of the theory of planned behavior in conjunction with the theory of
planned action in order to consider accepted norms as well as attitudes, behaviors, and
feelings of control. These theories are applicable to safety culture as employee safety
attitude and behavior have been found to be influenced by an organization's safety
culture, which is based on the organization's beliefs and attitude toward safety (Choudhry
et al., 2007).
Since the theory of planned behavior is good at explaining behavior, it is often
used to measure interventions used to modify culture. Steinmetz, Knappstein, Ajzen,
Schmidt, and Kabst (2016) conducted a meta-analysis of 123 interventions conducted
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utilizing the theory of planned behavior. “The theory states that the main driver for
behavior is the intention to perform the behavior. The intention, in turn, is a function of
underlying motivational variables (i.e., attitude toward the behavior, subjective norm, and
perceived behavioral control)” (Steinmetz, et al., 2016). This meta-analysis also
confirmed the usefulness of the theory of planned behavior in designing interventions
intended to change behavior.
Social exchange theory indicates that if employees perceive that the company is
concerned with their well being, employees will work to benefit the company (Blau,
1964). When applying social exchange theory to occupational safety, the theory suggests
that if safety is seen as a concern, employees will comply with safety requirements, with
exchanges influencing safety culture as described by Reader, Mearns, Lopes and Kuha
(2017). This is echoed by Zacharatos et al. (2005) who found that if safety is perceived
as a value by management and upheld, employees will perform work with safety in mind.
The perception commitment of management commitment to safety predicts behavior
(Zohar & Polachek, 2014).
From a functional perspective, climate perceptions should refer to policies-in-use,
or enacted policies, rather than to their formal counterparts, because only the
former inform employees of the probable organizational consequences of acting
safely (vs. speedily). Thus, a consensus should occur when management and
peers display an internally consistent pattern of action concerning safety, even if it
differs from the formally declared policy. For example, site managers might
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expect workers to cut corners whenever production falls behind schedule, despite
oﬃcial claims to the contrary
(Zohar & Polachek, 2014, p.377).
Reader et al. (2017) found that health and wellness initiatives implemented by
employers similarly influenced employee perception of concern by employers and lead to
increased safety behaviors. Employees perceive that their safe behaviors are reciprocity
for the concern expressed by employers. Mullen, Kelloway, and Teed (2017), conducted
a study utilizing social exchange theory framework, in which they indicate that future
research is needed to assess the impact of the interventions that can improve safety
leadership and encourage employee safety behaviors to prevent incidents. My study
focused on the perception of the effectiveness of influence of executives on the safety
culture of the organization.
Literature Review
Occupational Incidents and Safety Culture
Each year United States’ occupational accidents result in the death of more than
4,600 individuals and the serious injury of nearly five million more (Hofmann et al.,
2017). Occupational injuries effect employees, employers, and the general economy, yet
it is difficult and imprecise to calculate losses, as assumptions are made that change
across generations, genders, and family status (Lebeau, Duguay, & Boucher, 2014). As
Serrier, Sultan-Taieb, Luce, and Bejean (2014), indicated, occupational incidents have
"an impact on economic growth by affecting the labor supply, in particular through the
number of working days lost because of illness or accident and the reduced productivity
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of employees at work" (p.661). Marucci-Wellman et al. (2015) estimated an annual
impact to the United States’ economy of nearly $50 billion dollars on direct medical costs
alone and an impact of $600 billion over the course of the research (1998–2010). While
the number of occupational injury cases in the United States has been reduced yearly, the
costs has not; it is unknown if this is due to more severe injuries, an aging workforce, or
more costly treatment (Marucci-Wellman et al., 2015). Despite limitations, studies
calculating the costs of occupational injuries are conducted with the intent to highlight
the appropriate path forward and the importance of research and injury prevention
(Lebeau et al., 2014). For example, Serrier, Sultan-Taieb, Luce, and Bejean (2014) found
that the cost of occupational lung cancer can cost between 500,000 to 1.5 million Euros.
The study showed that asbestos exposure, which can result in occupational cancer, is
avoidable through the use of existing technology and preventative measures, which
means that the most effective means is to prevent, rather than treat occupational cancer as
a result of asbestos exposure (Serrier et al., 2014). Similarly, Fabius et al. (2013) built on
previous research which indicated that every dollar spent on the medical bills of an
occupational injury resulted in an additional $2.13 lost by the company. The results
showed that there is a correlation between organizations that reduce health and safety
risks and those that outperform the market (Fabius et al., 2013). In order to prevent
incidents, the cause must be understood.
In many cases, investigations associated with occupational incidents show that
noncompliance with safety procedures is a root cause of incidents (Dahl & Olsen, 2013).
Historical research and current research showed that a contributing cause in nearly all
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occupational incidents is unsafe behavior (Goh et al., 2018). Research conducted by
Shea et al. (2016) showed significant correlation between occupational injury occurrence
and employee attitude toward safety. Employee safety attitude and behavior are
influenced by an organization's safety culture, which is based on the organization's beliefs
and attitude toward safety (Choudhry et al., 2007) and exhibited in the behaviors of
employees (Brettel et al., 2015).
Employee behaviors were explained in the the Deepwater Horizon incident
investigation through analyzing the oil rig fire that killed 11, injured 16 and cost $34
billion in medical claims and legal settlements (Reader & O’Connor, 2014). This event
demonstrates the association between leadership acceptance of unsafe behaviors,
unrealistic production expectations, and the occurrence of serious occupational incidents
(Oudhuis & Tengblad, 2018). Unsafe behavior is formed by the attitudes and beliefs
toward safety due to a lack of management commitment to maintaining a positive safety
culture (Zhang et al., 2018). Conversely, when a positive safety culture is evident,
injuries will be reduced as all employees will be continually looking out for and
correcting hazards before injuries occur (Vredenbrugh, 2002). If safety is perceived as a
value by management and upheld, employees will perform work with safety in mind,
reducing injuries (Zacharatos et al., 2005). This is especially important when considering
that management is responsible for addressing conflicts between strategic goals such as
safety and production (Engemann & Scott, 2018). One way in which leaders can
influence the development of a safety culture is through leadership styles.
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The leadership style embraced by organizational leaders can influence employee
safety culture, behavior, and ultimately safety performance (Clarke, 2013). Kark, KatzNavon, and Delegach, (2015) described two types of employee safety behavior: voluntary
proactive behaviors and mandatory compliance behaviors. The voluntary behaviors are
often driven by leadership styles, which result in employees working to improve
conditions and practices and a reduced rate of injury. For example, while transactional
leadership has been found to elicit the minimum response required to maintain safety
compliance, leadership in the form of transformational leadership has been shown to
reduce the occurrence of injuries by improving the safety culture of the organization
(Clarke, 2013). A true and genuine compassion for employees must be exhibited by a
leader in order to truly demonstrate transformational leadership as it applies to safety
management (Clarke, 2013). When leaders encourage and motivate their employees
using transformational leadership styles, the employees ultimately adopt the value of the
leader, adopting values that improve the safety culture within the organization and
increase the proactive safety behaviors of employees (Clarke, 2013). Transactional
leadership, on the other hand, typically fosters mere compliance in safety, as it rewards
the right behavior and punishes bad behavior (Clarke, 2013).
Karim (2016) evaluated the relationship between transformational leadership and
safety climate in the Pakistani pharmaceutical industry. The study showed a positive
relationship between transformational leadership and safety climate.
The core concept of safety climate is that they are formed on the basis of practical
and visible actions taken by an organization to improve the safety situation. So a
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leadership style like transformational leadership is a kind of action which can be
seen by the workforce which helps to form and improve their perception about the
safety climate that is evident. (Karim, 2016, p.509)
Kark et al. (2015) developed a study based on the recommendations for future
studies of the Clark (2013) study; identifying the mechanisms that make transactional and
transformational leadership successful. The study indicated that "when the leader is
perceived as transformational, he or she is able to enhance a variety of behaviors
contributing to organizational safety including those of compliance" (p.1343).
Similarly, the differences between positional and inspirational leaders can impact
safety culture. Positional leaders achieve results by telling people what to do because
they have power over them, while inspirational leaders achieve results because they are
passionate about the cause and are able to clearly communicate the why and the
importance of acting in a certain way (Cooper, 2015). Thus, inspirational leaders often
inspire others to comply (Cooper, 2015).
Safety behavior is composed of participation and compliance, where compliance
is mandatory and participation is not. To sustain a reduction in injuries, safety
participation must be a focus, over mere safety compliance (Clarke 2013). This focus is
derived from management, from front line to executives.
With regard to safety culture and the front line employee, the most consistent
demonstration of safety culture and the most important relationship molding the safety
culture of the employee comes from their direct manager (Kozlowski & Doherty, 1989).
Kapp (2012) found that the relationship between the front line employee and their direct
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supervisor drives employee behavior and safety compliance. Supervisors who place
greater value on safety experience greater compliance, while those who place lower value
on safety experience lower levels of compliance (Kapp, 2012). The study conducted by
Michael, Guo, Wiedenbeck, and Ray (2006) found that positive exchanges between
employees and supervisors can affect employee’s behaviors, impacting safety
performance because those with high quality relationships feel as though they can express
concerns with workplace safety, resulting in fewer accidents. Zohar and Polachek
(2014), investigated the effect of communications from the front line manager on the
safety culture and resulting safety performance of shop floor employees. When there was
communication from the front-line manager to the shop floor employees, the results
found improvements to safety behavior and culture, teamwork and safety performance
(Zohar & Polachek, 2014).
Michael et al. (2006) found that positive exchanges between employees and
supervisors can affect employee’s behaviors, impacting safety performance. This occurs
because those with high quality relationships feel as though they can express concerns
with workplace safety, resulting in fewer accidents (Michael et al., 2006).
Kapp (2012) found that the relationship between the front line employee and their
direct supervisor drives employee behavior and safety compliance (Kapp, 2012).
Supervisors who place greater value on safety experience greater compliance, while those
who place lower value on safety experience lower levels of compliance (Kapp, 2012).
Similarly, Dahl & Olsen (2013), hypothesized that worker compliance would increase
with leadership involvement. The results of the study confirm previous research, which
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identifies that leaders who emphasize the importance of safety realize greater safety
performance (Dahl & Olsen, 2013).
The connection between safety culture development and the direct manager of the
front line employee is vital, however, the direct manager also oversees quality and
production, among other business aspects (Witherill & Kolak, 1996). A study conducted
by Nordlöf, Wiitavaara, Winblad, Wijk, and Westerling (2015) in Sweeden, in a high risk
metalworking facility. In this type of organization, the rate of significant days away from
work (> 90) is nearly twice the average of other high risk industries. For that reason, is
important to understand the drivers of injuries. The results of this study showed that
management expectations, leading to a trade off of safety for productivity, were the main
reasons for employee risk taking (Nordlöf et al., 2015). In the example of the Deepwater
Horizon catastrophe, employees were rewarded for cost-cutting measures and on time
production delivery, not for safety performance (Smith, 2011). It is for this reason that
the direct manager of the front line employee may not convey the same level of
enthusiasm and level of commitment as the senior management demonstrates. This
research intended to fill gaps in existing research as well as address limitations in recent
studies.
Pilbeam et al. (2016) found that the relationship between the front line supervisor
and his/her direct reports have been studied, while other leadership relationships (such as
senior managers) that set the tone for safety culture within their organizations are in need
of investigation. Where studies have been conducted, their transferability is limited. A
study was conducted by Fruhen et al. (2014) since previous research indicated that senior
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leaders had significant influence on safety culture but did not explain which
characteristics of the senior leader had the greatest effect. The study indicated that policy
making of senior leaders was key to influence of safety among air traffic management
companies (Fruhen et al., 2014). Biggs et al. (2013) found that leaders identified
leadership and visibility as the primary, effective means to implementing a positive safety
culture in the Australian construction industry.
Antonsen (2009) found that organizations struggle with ensuring that the safety
culture of the executive leadership team is conveyed to shop for employees through their
front line supervisor (Antonsen, 2009). Most recently, it has been found that senior
leaders use dynamic or on the fly leadership methods (Gravina et al., 2017) which raise
concerns about leaders’ interventions on safety culture and the implications of those
interventions on safety behaviors and work related accidents (Engemann & Scott, 2018).
In alignment with the recommendations of Sheehan, Donohue, Shea, Cooper and
De Cieri (2016), the data to be used in my research will be collected from across the
United States, representing many different types of organizations (private and public,
high and low hazard) in different sectors (service industry, manufacturing, healthcare,
etc.) and across multiple organizations and those which do not represent only blue collar
jobs.
My research collected information from safety professionals supporting various
organizations. This is in alignment with Vredenbrugh (2002) who stressed the
importance of “research concerning culture frequently focuses upon key informants who
are identified as those possessing special or more complete knowledge than others in the
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organization” (p.266). The safety professional has access to all levels of employees;
from senior management to shop floor employees. Olle-Espluga et al., (2014) also
acknowledged the unique perspective of safety professionals in assessing management
attitudes and safety climate. My study also addresses a limitation of the Michael et al.
(2006) study, by collecting information from the perspective of the safety professional;
not senior leaders, the supervisor or shop floor employees measuring themselves.
Flin (2003) found that senior leaders are more likely to share what they believe
are the safety related responses of a senior leader; rather than their actual beliefs. My
study reviewed the attitude and commitment of the senior leader through their
interactions with their organization’s safety professional. This is in alignment with
Fruhen et al. (2014) who suggested researching the views of other employees in the
organizational hierarchy. Specifically, Fruhen et al. (2014) found that including other
individuals within the organizational hierarchy can “help identify whether senior
managers’ personal characteristics differ in their influence on safety at different
organizational levels” (p.18). This research aimed to fill the identified gap by identifying
which characteristics, at the senior manager organizational levels, have been identified as
having the greatest impact on safety culture and safety performance (Fruhen et al., 2014).
One of the limitations presented in the research of Dahl & Olsen (2013) is that the
questionnaire did not consider the different hierarchical levels of leaders in their analysis.
Dahl and Olsen’s study (2013) has an identified limitation that my research filled;
assessing leadership engagement at various organizational levels.
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Bronkhorst (2018) revealed significant improvement in the perception of senior
management priority of safety after conducting walk arounds on the shop floor.
However, the study was unable to indicate which intervention at which hierarchical level
had the greatest effect on safety culture improvement. "Future studies could try to
develop intervention studies using various treatment arms to disentangle individual
effects and fruitful combinations." (Bronkhorst, 2018, p.28). Bronkhorst (2018) also
identified a limitation of the study was that there was no qualitative data collected on the
interventions to understand the why and the how of the effectiveness of the intervention.
Noncompliance with safety procedures is a root cause in a majority of
investigations, which “underlines the importance of identifying the organizational factors
that affect the level of safety compliant behavior” (Dahl & Olsen, 2013, p.17).
Development of Safety Culture
During 2014, the United States’ working population witnessed the death of
greater than 4,600 individuals who reported to work for the day with the intent of
providing for their livelihood (Hofmann et al., 2017). Several million additional
individuals are injured at work each year, causing various levels disability, which result
in hardships to the family of the injured employee and society as a whole (Hofmann et
al., 2017). The direct costs of injuries alone cost the United States’ economy
approximately $50 billion dollars per year (Marucci-Wellman, Courtney, Corns, Sorock,
Webster, Wasiak, & Leamon, 2015).
Unsafe behaviors are “affected by an organization’s socially transmitted beliefs
and attitudes toward safety” (Vredenbrugh, 2002, p.260). The organization’s beliefs and
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attitudes toward safety form an organization’s safety culture, which influences employee
safety behavior (Choudhry, Fang, & Mohamed, 2007). When a positive safety culture is
evident, injuries will be reduced as all employees will be continually looking out for and
correcting hazards before injuries occur (Vredenbrugh, 2002).
Connection Between Incidents and Unsafe Behavior
There are nearly 20 employees killed each day and nearly 20,000 injured in the
US, however a contributing cause in nearly all is unsafe behavior (Vredenburgh, 2002).
This is supported by previous research that indicates that “safety performance is affected
by an organization’s socially transmitted beliefs and attitudes toward safety”
(Vredenbrugh, 2002, p.260). Vredenburgh (2002) indicates that the goal of a positive
safety culture is to have all employees continually looking out for and correcting hazards.
“A safety culture motivates and recognizes safe behavior by focusing on the attitudes and
behaviors of the employees (Vredenbrugh, 2002, p.260). This research was conducted by
NIOSH and involved surveying risk managers from ~60 hospitals throughout the United
States. Risk managers were interviewed as “research concerning culture frequently
focuses upon key informants who are identified as those possessing special or more
complete knowledge than others in the organization” (Vredenbrugh, 2002, p.266). It is
for this reason that the proposed research will include interviewing safety professionals
regarding their perceptions of safety culture within organizations. The Vrendenbrugh
study (2002) involved surveying the participants on elements of safety culture, as they
were employed at the hospital. Such items included training, management commitment,
communication and feedback, selection and participation. Injury rates and injury severity
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were also considered. With regards to findings, “The most important finding of this
study is that when organizations take proactive measures to protect their employees, the
company derives a financial benefit in reduced lost time and workers compensation
expenses. While previous research has typically discussed management practices as
general goals, the current study systematically examined the specific elements of these
practices that predict employee injury rates (Vredenbrugh, 2002, p.273).
Typical workplace safety programs
Safety programs are often built around the ability of an employee to recognize
hazards (Albert, Hallowell & Kleiner, 2013). However, research indicated that in the
construction industry, approximately 38% of hazards are identified. This means that the
ability to prevent accidents by identifying hazards is significantly lower than desired. In
order to facilitate change, this research began with 14 safety professionals coming
together to develop a classroom and field training program intended to improve the
recognition of hazards. To ensure construction employees were engaged and willing to
accept change, the process consisted of the following: explaining the risk of uncorrected
hazards, explaining the impact to the worker and their family, explaining what constitutes
a hazard, training with the use of mnemonics to help enhance recognition and providing
instruction on how to correct hazards. The result was a 31% improvement in the
recognition of hazards over the course of 1 year and 8 sessions. This research will be
used as part of the proposed research to begin investigating how the safety professional
impacts the front line employee commitment to safety and any mediating role the safety
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professional has compared to the effect of executive level commitment to safety on the
front line employee.
Impact of safety professionals
Olsen (2012) recognized that safety professionals within an organization are often
viewed as technical in their approach. Therefore, when strategic organizational decisions
are required, input from the safety professional may not be considered. However, tactics
employed by safety professionals can allow them to have strategic impact by influencing
the change process. Previous research indicated that safety professionals prefer to work
within the areas of regulation and technical knowledge but does not identify the methods
that are used by those who work strategically to implement change. To conduct the study
addressing this gap, 10 safety professionals were interviewed. A qualitative analysis was
conducted where participants shared examples of changes that they have facilitated and
how they did so. Some of the methods employed with middle managers included
expressing buy in from upper management, trying to get middle managers to understand
their responsibility for safety (which produced various levels of success, ranging from
managers writing operating procedures including safety means to safety professionals
filing incident reports on behalf; mostly due to management engagement). Most safety
professionals worked with site committees and all identified the importance of
influencing stakeholders. The trend was that knowledge was used to influence others,
followed by auditing to show deficiencies and share with senior management. This
research was used as part of my research to begin investigating how the safety
professional impacts management commitment to safety and any mediating role the
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safety professional has on middle and front line management’s commitment compared to
the impact of executive level commitment to safety.
Leadership styles of management and the impact on safety
Clarke (2013) conducted a meta analytic review of existing research on
transactional and transformational leadership. Transformational leadership has been seen
to increase proactive safety behavior in employees. Transactional leadership, on the
other hand, typically fosters compliance in safety, as it rewards the right behavior and
punishes bad behavior. Clarke (2013) has identified that it is likely appropriate to use a
combination of both styles; in order to first ensure compliance and then establish
proactive behavior. One limitation of the study is that there must be further research on
how to implement the results of this study.
According to Karim (2016), every 15 seconds, a person dies in a work related
incident and that rate of injury is even higher when unemployment is high as there is less
consideration for workplace health and safety. The study intended to indicate the
relationship between transformational leadership and safety climate in the Pakistani
pharmaceutical industry. Questionnaires were distributed with a rate of return greater
than 75%, indicating a positive relationship between transformational leadership and
safety climate. “The core concept of safety climate is that they are formed on the basis of
practical and visible actions taken by organization to improve the safety situation. So a
leadership style like transformational leadership is kind of action which can be seen by
the workforce which helps to form and improve their perception about the safety climate
that is evident” (p.509). The study indicated the disproval of a hypothesis associated with
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safety attitudes mediating safety knowledge and safety climate. However, the authors
further hypothesize that the individuals involved in the study did not develop a positive
safety attitude (despite safety knowledge) because their religion (Muslim) indicates that
destiny will determine whether or not an injury occurs and there is no intervening
measure that can then prevent such an event.
Uhl-Bien (2006) presents the theory of relational leadership as a framework to
study the leadership that, among other things, influences values, attitudes and their
corresponding behaviors. Relational leadership is associated with the connections
formed between organizations and their members. Uhl-Bien (2006) explains how
relationship is the new form of leadership; rather than power and authority. The article
also indicated the need to research the development of the research (through relational
leadership theory) as opposed to simply observations of the quality of relationships
(through leader member exchange).
Organizational culture can have an effect on worker behavior; leadership style can
be a determinant of safety behavior and thus, safety performance. While transactional
leadership has been found to elicit the minimum response required to maintain safety
compliance, safety leadership in the form of transformational leadership has been shown
to reduce the occurrence of injuries by improving the safety culture/safety behavior of the
organization (Clarke, 2013). When leaders encourage and motivate their employees
through the practice of transformational leadership, the employees ultimately adopt the
value of the leader. Thus, when the leader is transformational, the employees adopt
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values that improve the safety culture/safety behavior within the organization (Clarke,
2013).
Container terminals are hazardous locations, resulting of the death of nearly 100
people each year with nearly an additional 100,000 injured (Lu & Yang, 2010). “The
United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has recognized the
power of leadership and pointed to management leadership as a key element in safety
issues. Safety leadership that motivates team members to work harder, to work
efficiently, and to take ownership of responsibility for safety performance is encouraged”
(Lu & Yang, 2010, p.123). The results of this study indicated three dimensions of safety
leadership. These dimensions included safety motivation, policy and concern. The
findings of this study are relevant to my research as these terms are included in the
questions included in the interview process.
Curcuruto, Conchie, Mariani, and Violante (2015) were able to demonstrate the
effect of transformational leadership by measuring employee engagement in safety and
safety behaviors compared to safety performance. Leaders who empower their
employees are generally associated with the development of positive behaviors while a
strict adherence to a hierarchical reporting structure is not (Lee, Idris & Delfabbro, 2016).
Transformational leadership leads to improved safety perception, safety culture
and provide guidance for training and program development (Clarke, 2013). The
leadership style embraced by organizational leaders can be a determinant of safety
performance. For example, while transactional leadership has been found to elicit the
minimum response required to maintain safety compliance, safety leadership in the form
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of transformational leadership has been shown to reduce the occurrence of injuries by
improving the safety culture of the organization (Clarke, 2013). In the realm of
occupational safety, performance can be impacted by transformational and transactional
leadership styles. A true and genuine compassion for employees must be exhibited by a
leader in order to truly demonstrate transformational leadership as it applies to safety
management (Clarke, 2013). When leaders encourage and motivate their employees, the
employees ultimately adopt the value of the leader. Thus, when the leader is
transformational, the employees adopt values that improve the safety culture within the
organization (Clarke, 2013).
Hierarchical structure relating to incidents and safety performance
A study conducted by Hill, Seo, Kang, and Taylor (2012) found that top
management impact on change in an organization was related to their hierarchal distance
from employee. The Brettel, Chomik, and Flatten (2015) study involved the review of
entrepreneurial orientation, leading to better performance. A negative relationship was
found between entrepreneurial orientation and the impact of hierarchical culture (Brettel,
Chomik, & Flatten, 2015). This study filled a gap in existing research as previous
research indicated the link but failed to identify how culture impacts entrepreneurial
orientation/organizational success. Culture of the organization is exhibited in the
behaviors of employees. Group culture is based on trust and mutual respect, where
hierarchical culture is based on rules, control, structure and regulations. The concern for
an organization is that the organization will be less innovative with employees at lower
levels feeling powerless. Other barriers of hierarchical cultures include slow

37
communication, slow decision making and a lack of trusts between departments which
negatively impacts the flow of knowledge. This research includes a great example of a
purpose statement, indicating that “the primary purpose of this study is to investigate
whether organizational culture plays a significant role in determining the levels of
innovativeness, proactivness and risk-taking” in small and medium businesses (Brettel,
Chomik, & Flatten, 2015, p.869). This article also includes a great example of the
explaining theoretical foundations. This research provides references to seminal works
providing the definition of culture. Proactiveness is yet another dimension of
entrepreneurial orientation and is a strategic resource.
Organizational culture can have an effect on worker behavior. Empowering
leaders and hierarchical culture are two traits exhibited as part of organizational culture
(Lee, Idris, & Delfabbro, 2016). However, empowering leaders is generally associated
with the development of positive behaviors while hierarchical culture is not. This study
intended to review the effects of both traits, combined. The longitudinal study identified
that while empowering leadership increased work engagement, but the study did not
demonstrate that work engagement was reduced in the presence of a hierarchical culture.
This study was interesting, in that the authors were not able to observe what they
hypothesized; that a hierarchal culture would have a negative impact on worker behavior.
This study is interesting, as other studies have demonstrated the expected results. An
interesting follow up, case study would include a review of the culture present in the
organization that mediated the effect of the hierarchical culture.
Manager impact on safety at work
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With regards to safety culture and the front line employee, the most consistent
demonstration of safety culture comes from the relationship with their direct manager
(Kozlowski & Doherty, 1989). However, the direct manager of the front line employee
oversees safety, quality and production, among other business aspects (Witherill &
Kolak, 1996). It is for this reason that the direct manager of the front line employee may
not convey the same level of enthusiasm and level of commitment as the executive leader
demonstrates. Zohar, D., & Polachek, T. (2014) focused on whether or not safety climate
and performance would be impacted by educating managers. The study was comprised
of two groups; one that was educated on the importance of integrating safety into their
management style and the impact on productivity. The other group received no feedback.
“Results of this intervention study indicate that changes in supervisory messages
indicative of modified priorities among role facets during routine communications with
group members resulted in corresponding changes in safety climate, safety behavior,
subjective workload, teamwork, and (externally measured) safety audit levels “ (p.120).
Since the same effect was not observed in the control group, this indicates that worker
climate perceptions and behavior improved as a result of the feedback aimed to improve
supervisor discourse regarding the operationalization of safety.
Karim (2016) found that there was little impact on safety climate caused by safety
knowledge. This is interesting, as it means that the majority of the influence for safety
climate is caused by the influence of supervisors. This study is important because it is
carried out in a Pakistani pharmaceutical company as compared to previous research that
has been conducted in Western organizations. Despite the difference in the working
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population (where most individuals are illiterate in the Pakistani workforce) the
leadership characteristics employed by the supervisor in the form of transformational
leadership were found to influence the safety climate of employees.
The Role of Leadership and Leaders’ Behavioral Characteristics on Employees’
Safety Behavior in Plant Turnaround Maintenance of PETRONAS Petrochemical
Companies in Malaysia focused on transformational and transactional research and found
results similar to other studies. However, additionally, this study showed that safety
motivation can be a moderator between management's leadership style and employee's
safety behavior. This study is of interest because it took place in a non western country
and in a facility that was attempting a turn around. The fact that the facility needed to
make drastic changes is important, because these are often times when employee
motivation and engagement can be low, due to other operational challenges. Despite this,
the study was still able to show a relationship between employee behaviors and
leadership styles. Transactional leadership drives compliance while transactional
leadership drives participation and worker engagement.
Bandow, Self and Self (2014) found that managers that fail to manage employees
subject their organization to losing the high performers and retaining the poor performers
or problem employees and their associated liabilities. Poor performance is noticed by
other employees and at times, management is the unintended cause. Poor management
continues to allow poor performers as managers fail to take responsibility for their role in
performance or do not know how to respond at all. In other cases, management feels like
they are allowing employees to redeem themselves with another chance when in reality,
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they do nothing. For high performers, this do nothing approach can lead to low morale.
Previous research has indicated that managers often do not like to deliver bad news of
poor performance even when performance appraisals are accurate. One step that
organizations can take is to ensure proper training of managers, so that they document
performance, feedback and formal coaching. To help facilitate this, one recommendation
is for experienced managers to develop a script for dealing with underperforming
employees so that less experienced employees can learn, and the organization can
maintain a standard approach.
Cooper (2015), identified that there is a difference between positional and
inspirational leaders. Positional leaders achieve results by telling people what to do;
because they have power over them. Inspirational leaders achieve results because they
are passionate about the cause and are able to clearly communicate the “why” and the
importance of acting in a certain way. Thus, they often inspire others to comply. Safety
leaders are most successful when they adopt the servant style of leadership. Using this
style, they facilitate the fulfillment of others’ needs.
Duhigg (2016) found that working in groups helps to solve problems, come up
with creative solutions and recognize errors or mistakes faster. All of these help, but
questions remained about what makes a good team. Some believed that putting similar
people together worked best, others believed that friends outside of work comprised the
best teams. Google undertook a study to determine what qualities fostered the best
teams. Google learned that the best managers are good at communicating and avoid
micromanaging, but wanted to know what makes the successful teams, successful. They
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could not find correlation with groups that were friends, groups that were outgoing,
groups that were shy, groups that preferred very structured groups, groups that preferred
no hierarchy at all. Then, Google began to look at team culture and norms. They found
that norms differed significantly. They turned to past research, which showed that the
way people treated each other is what mattered. In this past research, random teams were
formed. The tasks required compromise to succeed. Typically, if a group came up with a
way to succeed in one task, they succeeded in all. The converse was also true. These
team members have mutual respect for each other, tend not to try to embarrass each other
and create a safe space for risk taking. One group at Google decided to informally test
the results. They found that though their group was all high performers, they were not
working together well. The leader believed that having respect for each other and feeling
safe together and learning to recognize the feelings of others would be facilitated by his
sharing of extremely personal information about his illness. Empathy and sensitivity may
go a long way in fostering team collaboration and team success.
Borgogni, Dello, Russo, and Latham (2011) found that an employee’s satisfaction
and commitment to their organization is based on their perception of the abilities of their
team, which is based on leader’s influence. Previous studies have identified a
relationship between employee’s perceptions of the abilities of the team and the actual
performance of the team. This study was intended to research the perceptions of the
abilities of the team and the perception of the leaders affected satisfaction with the job
and commitment to the organization. A leader can affect the effectiveness of the team
and perception of effectiveness by helping the group reach their goals, by providing
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feedback and facilitating teamwork amongst members of the team. The highest levels of
management are also key to an employee’s perception of the abilities of the organization,
as top leaders can develop procedures and goals that may or may not align groups. This
is important as previous studies found that job satisfaction is related to the perception of
the immediate leader. Similarly, level of perceived support was found to correlate to
commitment to an organization.
The significance of these findings for the workplace is that they show that
employees’ positive perceptions of their immediate supervisor are more strongly
related to the formulation of their beliefs regarding their group’s efficacy than
their perceptions of top management. However, since groups are embedded in an
organizational setting, group members’ positive perceptions of top management
are also related to their beliefs of their group’s collective efficacy…To strengthen
confidence in one’s group’s efficacy, the novelty of our findings suggests working
on self-efficacy and perceptions of leadership. We propose a specific training
aimed at managing the relationship with the supervisor. (Borgogni, p.10)
The Kapp (2012) study indicated that the relationship between the front line
employee and their direct supervisor drives employee behavior and safety compliance.
Supervisors who place greater value on safety experience greater compliance. Those
who place lower value on safety experience lower levels of compliance.
When considering fiscal responsibility, O’Toole (2002), identified that employers
must implement programs that will provide the greatest return on investment. For that
reason, it is important to consider the impact that safety culture has on reducing injures
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and whether or not it is worth the investment. In a longitudinal study (conducted over 45
months) at a concrete manufacturing plant, it was determined that employee’s positive
perceptions impacted reductions in injuries, with management’s commitment to safety
having the greatest impact on employee’s perceptions (O’Toole, 2002).
The study conducted by Michael, Guo, Wiedenbeck, and Ray (2006), was
conducted through the completion of nearly 600 questionnaires from employees working
in 5, Pennsylvania wood manufacturing companies. The study showed that positive
exchanges between employees and supervisors can affect employee’s behaviors,
impacting safety performance. This is able to occur because those with high quality
relationships feel as though they can express concerns with workplace safety, resulting in
fewer accidents. Again, this study indicated a limitation in the self reporting of safety
behaviors. The proposed research is intended to help fill this gap, by collecting
information from the perspective of the safety professional; not the supervisor or shop
floor employees measuring themselves. This can help to eliminate bias.
Kouabenan, Ngueutsa, and Mbaye (2015) conducted a study on first line
managers and their perceptions of risk in the job, level of involvement in safety and
perceived safety climate (Kouabenan, Ngueutsa, & Mbaye, 2015). The research of first
line managers (66) in France indicated that the greater the perceived risk, the more
involved the manager became (Kouabenan, Ngueutsa, & Mbaye, 2015).
A study was conducted by Fruhen, Mearns, Flin, and Kirwan (2014) because
literature reviews indicated that there was research that indicated that senior leaders had
significant influence on safety culture but did not explain which characteristics of the
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senior leader had the most effect. The study indicated was that policy making of senior
leaders was key to influence of safety. This research was conducted utilizing air traffic
management companies. This research also indicated the need to review the views of
other employees in the organizational hierarchy. Specifically, the study indicated that
“inclusion of more junior managers and the workforce can help identify whether senior
managers’ personal characteristics differ in their influence on safety at different
organizational levels” (Fruhen, Mearns, Flin & Kirwan, 2014, p.18). My research aimed
to fill the identified gap by identifying which characteristics, at different organizational
levels, have been identified as having the greatest impact on safety culture and safety
performance.
Yorio and Wachter (2014) conducted a study to focus on employee behaviors,
which are often implicated in serious occupational incidents. This research is pertinent to
my research as it is necessary to understand how employee behaviors correlate to safety
culture and the perceptions of management commitment to safety. In fact, this study
indicated a need for future research in assessing the effect of safety and health
management on human performance include a review over time. My research will
review health and safety management, from the perception of the safety professional,
over a period of time.
A study was conducted by Nordlöf, Wiitavaara, Winblad, Wijk, and Westerling,
(2015), in Sweeden, in a high risk metalworking facility. In this type of organization, the
rate of significant days away from work (> 90) is nearly twice the average of other high
risk industries. For that reason, is important to understand the drivers of injuries. Culture
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is found to be a significant indicator of injuries; from Chernobyl to the Challenger space
shuttle. Management’s commitment to safety behavior is part of safety culture, and
influences whether or not workers carry out risky behaviors. The results of this study
indicated that management expectations, leading to a trade off of safety for productivity,
were the main reasons for employee risk taking.
Choudry (2014) identified that behavior based safety is one manner in which to
improve safety performance. This is especially pertinent as a behavior-based safety
program requires front line leadership engagement. This is an example of how front-line
leaders can exhibit such significant influence over shop floor employees, which is the
focus of the proposed research. In this article, the researchers follow employees in the
construction industry. Safe behaviors (leading indicators of safety performance) are
reviewed on a weekly basis. With positive (and negative) reinforcement for observed
behaviors, as well as continuous training, the researchers were able to observe an increase
in safe behaviors from 80% to 95% after 9 weeks! This is an example of how front line
management can drive habits, behaviors and attitudes of employees. The front line
managers were successful because they demonstrated their genuine concern for their
employees and commitment to successful implementation of the behavior based safety
program.
The study conducted by Flin (2003) reviewed the different roles that various
management levels play in the development of safety culture, behavior and safety
performance. The study indicated that senior management commitment to safety be
measured periodically. It also suggests that senior leaders are more likely, when asked,
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share what they believe are the safety related responses of a senior leader; rather than
their actual beliefs. This observation is the reason why the proposed research includes
the study of the attitude and commitment of the senior leader through their interactions
with their organization’s safety professional.
“Accident analyses and investigations regularly identify a lack of compliance
with rules and procedures as a central contributing factor to workplace accidents. This
underlines the importance of identifying the organizational factors that affect the level of
safety compliant behavior. The purpose of the present study was to examine how
workers’ perception of leadership involvement in daily work operations affects the level
of safety compliant behavior among workers” (Dahl & Olsen, 2013, p.17). Safety
behavior is comprised of participation and compliance, where compliance is mandatory
and participation is not. In this study, Dahl and Olsen (2013), hypothesized that worker
compliance would increase with leadership involvement. Greater than 10,000 Norwegian
petroleum employees participated in the longitudinal study, conducted by anonymous
questionnaires. The results of the study showed previous research, which identified that
leaders who emphasize the importance of safety realize greater safety performance. One
of the limitations presented in this study is that the questionnaire did not take into account
the different hierarchical levels of leaders in their analysis. Dahl and Olsen’s study
(2013) has an identified limitation that the proposed research will fill; assessing
leadership engagement at various organizational levels. This research also indicated the
need for safety management to be researched with general management techniques.
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Biggs, Banks, Davey, and Freeman (2013) involved qualitative and quantitative
analysis of safety leaders in the Australian construction industry. The leaders, which
ranged from executive leaders to front line managers to safety professionals provided
insight on safety culture and barriers to implementation of safety culture. The study
showed that leaders identified leadership and visibility as the primary, effective means to
implementing a positive safety culture. This article provides the definition of safety
culture and barriers of safety culture from only one side of the organization; the
management side of the organization.
Zohar and Polachek (2014), investigated the effect of communications from the
front line manager on the safety culture and resulting safety performance of shop floor
employees. In the control group, no feedback was provided to front line managers, but
feedback was obtained from direct reports. In the experimental group, two feedback
sessions were provided to managers on how to improve safety culture through
communication. Ultimately, the experimental group experienced improvements to safety
behavior and culture, teamwork and safety performance. This research continues to build
on some of Zohar’s seminal articles on safety culture from the 1980s.
Kouabenan, Ngueutsa, and Mbaye, (2015) focused on the first line managers and
their perceptions of risk in the job, level of involvement in safety and perceived safety
climate. The research of first line managers (66) in France indicated that the greater the
perceived risk, the more involved the manager became. Additionally, the greater the
perception of safety culture, the greater the involvement of the manager is safety. Unlike
some seminal research in this area (namely, Zohar), the study did not show significant
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effects on safety culture due to the attitude of upper management. This results of this
study, therefore, supports the proposed research as it provides a conflict with previous
research. This article also showed a similar study across different types of organizations.
The greater the perception of safety culture, the greater the involvement of the
manager is safety. This is important to highlight as employee’s positive perceptions of
safety culture impact reductions in injuries. Management commitment to safety was
found to have the greatest impact on employee’s perceptions (O’Toole, 2002).
Zohar and Polachek (2014), investigated the effect of communications from the
front line manager on the safety culture and resulting safety performance of shop floor
employees. When there was communication from the front line manager to the shop
floor employees, the results found improvements to safety behavior and culture,
teamwork and safety performance (Zohar & Polachek, 2014).
Michael, Guo, Wiedenbeck, and Ray (2006), found that positive exchanges
between employees and supervisors can affect employee’s behaviors, impacting safety
performance. This occurs because those with high quality relationships feel as though
they can express concerns with workplace safety, resulting in fewer accidents (Michael,
Guo, Wiedenbeck, & Ray, 2006).
Kapp (2012) found that the relationship between the front line employee and their
direct supervisor drives employee behavior and safety compliance (Kapp, 2012).
Supervisors who place greater value on safety experience greater compliance, while those
who place lower value on safety experience lower levels of compliance.
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Pilbeam, Doherty, Davidson, and Denyer (2016), found that the relationship
between the front line supervisor and his/her direct reports have been studied while other
leadership relationships (such as senior managers) that set the tone for safety culture
within their organizations are in need of investigation.
Implications of previous research on the proposed research study
With the intent of eliminating bias, as Flin (2003) found that senior leaders are
more likely to share what they believe are the safety related responses of a senior leader;
rather than their actual beliefs, the proposed study will review the attitude and
commitment of the senior leader through their interactions with their organization’s
safety professional.
My study used the theoretical and practical implications developed through Zohar
and Polachek (2014) and the keyword “organizational climate theory” for the research.
The research also incorporated the findings of Pilbeam et al. (2016), associated with the
relationship between the front line supervisor and his/her direct reports. Pilbeam et al.
(2016) found that the relationship between the front line supervisor and direct reports
have been studied, while other leadership relationships (such as senior managers) that set
the tone for safety culture within their organizations are in need of investigation, which is
the intent of the proposed research.
Olle-Espluga et al., (2014), identified that little research has been conducted to
analyze the relationship between safety representatives and the shop floor employees.
This relationship is an important factor that must be considered as part of the proposed
research; could the existence of and influence of a safety representative compensate for a
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less than ideal commitment of a manager to a positive safety culture? In this study, nine
out of ten safety representatives believed that management attitudes toward safety failed
to foster a culture of safety by an unwillingness to invest in safety if not regulatory
required (Olle-Espluga et al., 2014). Additionally, this article helps to support my
research and the direction of interviewing safety professionals. The article indicated the
unique perspective of safety professionals (or the slightly different “safety representative”
role, identified in this article). The findings of this research showed that management
attitudes drive safety climate.
Conchie, Moon, and Duncan (2013) found that the factors leading to the safety
leadership of a supervisor are under researched. When considering leadership styles and
the impact on organizational culture and the reduction of occupational injuries, this
research will address the Conchie et al. (2013) proposal for additional research by
considering the impact of trust, from other members of the organizations, on
organizational culture.
Fruhen, Mearns, Flin, and Kirwan (2013) identified the need for future studies to
compare the perceptions of safety culture across different industries and within different
levels of organizations as well as safety performance data. Fruhen, Mearns, Flin and
Firwan (2014), suggests analyzing the views of other employees in the organizational
hierarchy to include managers closer to shop floor employees so that “the workforce can
help identify whether senior managers’ personal characteristics differ in their influence
on safety at different organizational levels” (Fruhen, Mearns, Flin, & Kirwan, 2014,
p.18). Additionally, the proposed study will address a limitation of the Michael, Guo,
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Wiedenbeck, and Ray (2006) study, by collecting information from the perspective of the
safety professional; not the supervisor or shop floor employees measuring themselves.
The research conducted by Lee, Idris, and Delfabbro (2016) did not confirm the
results of Hill et al. (2012). Lee et al (2016), found that while empowering leadership
increased work engagement the research did not indicate that engagement was reduced in
the presence of a strict hierarchical culture. Due to the conflicting results observed in the
Lee et al. (2016) and Hill et al. (2012), studies, the proposed research will evaluate the
effect of hierarchical culture on safety culture and safety performance (and how that
culture is translated to behaviors at various hierarchical levels of the organization).
In alignment with the recommendations of Sheehan, Donohue, Shea, Cooper, and
De Cieri (2016), the data to be used in the proposed research will be collected from
across the United States, representing many different types of organizations (private and
public, high and low hazard) in different sectors (service industry, manufacturing,
healthcare, etc.) and across multiple organizations and those which do not represent only
blue collar jobs.
Research Methods
My research examined the perception of the effect of executives, front line
managers and all middle management on creating a positive safety culture. Qualitative
research is in alignment with Antonsen (2009), which confirms previous research
suggesting that qualitative analysis of a safety culture may be more appropriate than
quantitative analysis. Additionally, this research indicated that organizations struggle
with ensuring that the safety culture of the executive leadership team is conveyed to shop
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for employees through their front line supervisor (Antonsen, 2009). To understand the
perception of culture at various hierarchical levels of the organization, safety
professionals at various organizations will be consulted for interview.
The data was collected in the form of interviews from across the United States,
representing many different types of organizations (private and public, high and low
hazard) in different sectors (service industry, manufacturing, healthcare, etc.), to fill a
research gap indicated by Fruhen, Mearns, Flin and Kirwan (2013).
Nielsen (2014) acknowledges that a theoretical framework for safety culture is not
fully developed and there is a lack of studies on cultural change. Globally, literature
revealed that the creation of health and safety committees did not indicate a reduction in
injuries, but that a reduction was based on the activities completed by, the structuring and
size of the health and safety committee (Nielsen, 2014). This study showed the effect of
the health and safety committees on improving safety culture. This article supported my
research by explaining that the structure and focus of a safety committee (which
determines its effect on injury reduction) is set by the management team and their
commitment to safety. This study also indicated examples of how to measure safety
culture in qualitative research.
World class occupational safety and health (OSH) is typically identified by
organizations with:
1)OSH on par with business performance; 2) system based approach to OSH; 3)
continuous improvement; 4) OSH aligned with organization strategies and values;
and 5) promoting safety and health on and off the job. (Saujani, 2016, p.37)
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This is in conjunction with five qualities including (1) visible leadership of the
management team, (2) employee engagement, (3) operationalization of safety into the
business, (4) root cause analysis and data driven decision making, (5) implementing
health and safety requirements beyond mere compliance with regulatory requirements. In
this case study, lessons learned from working with a large, multi location printing
corporation with world class safety culture are shared. This article consisted of
significant literature review, to include definitions of world class safety culture and
qualities of high performing companies but provided less description of the interviews
conducted as part of the case study, to determine that the printing corporation met all of
the definitions of a world class safety culture. Information on what must be in place to
have a world class safety culture is very important to the proposed research. This study
influenced my research as another resource that defines what it means to have a positive
safety culture. This information was utilized as part of the coding process; after
completing interviews.
Safety performance
Reader, Noort, Sharrock, and Kirwan (2015) studied the effects of safety culture
as it crosses national borders. Specifically, the study indicated how national culture
affected safety behaviors such as identifying and reporting safety hazards. As part of the
study, Reader, et al., (2015) identified that Danish employees were involved in four times
the injuries when compared to their Swedish counterparts. Similarly, the study showed
that seafarers in three Asian countries differed in their safety culture, based on their
national culture. Rather than focusing on which national culture produces safer
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organizations, future studies should focus on how national culture affects safety culture.
This information can then be utilized by safety professionals to understand the style of
safety program that must be employed to be effective within different national cultures.
Similar to all other aspects of international management, safety management is also
affected by cultural differences as norms, values and history shape the behaviors of
employees. More specifically, in high risk industries, safety management becomes an
international concern as the high risk tasks cross national boundaries. Rather than
suggesting that some cultures are less safety conscious, the article focused on
understanding the importance of safety within a culture and developing programs
specifically oriented toward what is most effective at engaging that culture in
occupational safety. My research referenced this article to discuss how culture impacts
safety performance. Again, while it is not to say that some cultures do not value safety, it
is to indicate that it is necessary to understand what motivates or what type of programs
are most successful with a given culture.
Han, Saba, Lee, Mohamed, and Pena-Mora (2014) have identified that it is
necessary to systematically approach safety. This means that the effect on safety
performance must be compared to production pressures (Han, Saba, Lee, Mohamed, &
Pena-Mora, 2014). After collecting data, the authors developed a simulated case study.
The results identified that scheduling delays and rework had the greatest impact on safety
performance (Han et al., 2014). Thus, it is most important that management pay attention
to the perceptions of employees that leads them to believe that scheduling delays
necessitate rushed performance of tasks (which lead to safety incidents). As part of my
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research, it was expected that perceptions of “shop floor” employees and the direct
managers of “shop floor” employees were key. My research hypothesized that these
perceptions will surround what individuals believe the executive level manager really
wants. For example, when shop floor employees hear that safety is key, but we need to
make production today, they may develop the perception that it is acceptable to take
shortcuts, as long as no one is injured. In reality, the perception may be skewed, as the
message because skewed as it traveled from the executive to the shop floor employee.
My research needed to be careful to capture and understand the perceptions present at
each level of employees within the organization.
Sweden and Denmark have similar cultural similarities. This includes gender
equality, collectivism, participatory and team based leadership styles. However, their
rates of industry in construction are significantly different, leading to a need to explore
the differences in safety culture that contribute to the difference in occupational injury
rates. Denmark experiences an occupational fatality rate 33% higher than the rate in
Sweden (Grill et al., 2015). The research was conducted as a qualitative case study, with
nine participants, a mixture of Swedish and Danish participant, with ranges in age
including both sexes a range of professional roles and a range of construction worker
rolls. The first theme that emerged was participatory management, where management
would seek input and work together to make decisions with all employees (Grill et al.,
2015). This allowed for more rapid addressing of safety issues or concerns. This is not
the case in Denmark. In addition, participatory management styles are regulated in
Sweden, further driving the culture in that direction (Grill et al., 2015). Directive
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management also indicated the difference between the two countries. For example, the
Danish employees indicated that directive management was utilized to communicate
safety. However, the culture was that once the manager who explained the rules had left,
the employees were left to do as they see fit (Grill et al., 2015). This style of leadership
left no room for input from employees on a better or a safer way to perform work. One
example provided by a Danish participant explained that if the manager provided
direction to obtain a ladder, the employee would do just that, rather than identifying that
the job could be completed safer and faster by using a lift (Grill et al., 2015). This is an
important distinction in how management styles foster safety culture, and will be
valuable research to add to my study. The proposed study will utilize this research to
help develop interview questions. Since the questions in this study related to the culture
of the organization, the questions will be useful. Data to support this study was obtained
from safety professionals, which further justifies the decisions of proposed research to
interview safety professionals to help identify the safety culture at different hierarchical
levels of an organization.
The role of national culture in determining safety culture
Power, Klassen, Kull, and Simpson, (2015) evaluated the effects of national
culture in management decisions to invest in safety and the environment. The results
indicate that larger plants are more likely to invest in safety and the environment. It is
also more likely that international firms (with more complex operations) are more likely
to invest due to their resources and access to and understanding of industry best practices.
A surprising result of the study was that facilities with more engineers did not invest
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more in safety and the environment. This is surprising, based on the fact that it may be
expected that more engineers would result in more recognition for safety and
environmental improvement needs. The study showed that the importance that the senior
manager places on safety and the environment impacted the amount of resources spent on
safety and environmental investments. The authors speculate about why it is possible
that facilities with a larger number of engineers invest less in safety and environmental
improvements. There are no supporting citations to backup these alternatives.
Ahmed and Waqas (2017) conducted research in Pakistan, regarding injuries,
safety culture and employee turnover. The quantitative study was conducted by
surveying 111 employees. The intent was to review whether injury rate increased
employee intent to leave a job. Safety culture and employee intent to leave a job were
also evaluated. It was determined that injury rate impacts employee intent to leave a job.
However, safety culture was not found to impact employee intent to leave a job. This is
likely attributed to the poverty, unemployment and lack of job security in factory and
construction work. This research showed reason to question whether job insecurity or
income level will have an impact on the development of safety culture. The article also
cited an instrument of safety culture that was reviewed as part of my research; an
instrument created by Frazier in 2013.
Defining safety culture
Fedorychev and Hammer (2015), indicate that the most important aspect of
improving safety culture is identifying the current state of the safety culture. Thus, the
outcome of the study proposed the use of different types of analysis to qualify an
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organization’s safety culture. For example, the recommendation is to utilize scale
questionnaires to help to “represent identifiable and recognizable characteristics of safety
culture” (Fedorychev & Hammer, 2015, p.756).
Fedorycheva and Hammer (2015), indicate that the most important aspect of
improving safety culture is identifying the current state of the safety culture. Thus, the
results of the study indicated a need for the use of different types of analysis to qualify an
organization’s safety culture. For example, the recommendation is to utilize scale
questionnaires.
Specific incident investigations, related to safety culture
Bing, Zhengdong, Yao, Yan, and Zhenjiang (2014), identified that in China, the
fatalities in mining (per million tons) is ten times the United States’ rate. This is typically
considered to be the result of improper management; a reactive rather than proactive
approach to safety, insufficient safety funding and a lack of safety training. A SWOT
analysis was utilized to determine how to implement a safety management system. The
result is a proposal starts with executive leadership explaining the objective and
commitment to safety. Then, roles and responsibilities must be explained for each
position in the organization. Identify hazards as well as applicable laws and procedures
governing the hazards, train on the hazards and controls as well as the importance of the
management system; this will help build the safety culture which the management team
must foster. Finally, generate a system to observe, adjust and continuously improve the
safety management system.
Change Management
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Change is employed in order to give the employer a competitive advantage, but it
means stress and worry to an employee (Bordia, Restubog, Jimmieson, & Irmer, 2011).
While past research has been focused on instances of change, it has not focused on how
historical changes within the organization impact the attitude and behavior of employees.
This Bordia et al., research was conducted to fill this gap. One of the hypotheses of the
study was that a poor change management history is inversely related organizational
trust. A similar hypothesis states that as a poor history of change management increases,
so will cynicism. Finally, those likely to be cynical to change a less open to change. In
order to test the hypothesis, several different studies were conducted. In the first, 155
employees were surveyed two months after the organization had announced a merger
with another company. All employees had previously experienced a history of poor
change management. In the second, an educational institution was surveyed, where
previous poor change management had occurred. Nearly 125 employees responded at
two points; within 3 months of the change implemented and two years post change.
These studies failed to disprove the null hypothesis. The authors recommend that the
aspects of the study that were self reported are modified to decrease bias. Future studies
should also focus on an understanding of poor change management history. This study
should be used by leaders to understand that past experience with change management
can predict attitude, behavior, engagement, satisfaction and turnover. All of these
elements (attitude, behavior, engagement, satisfaction and turnover) are also related to
employee perception of the employer; leading to the development of safety culture.
Employee behavior
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The study conducted by Kark, Katz-Navon, and Delegach, (2015) described two
types of employee safety behavior; voluntary proactive behaviors and mandatory
compliance behaviors. The voluntary behaviors are often driven by leadership styles,
which result in employees working to improve conditions and practices and a reduced
rate of injury. Kark et al. conducted a study based on the recommendations for future
studies of the Clark (2013) study; identifying the mechanisms that make transactional and
transformational leadership successful. The study showed that "when the leader is
perceived as transformational, he or she is able to enhance a variety of behaviors
contributing to organizational safety including those of compliance" (p.1343). The
results of this study indicated that training at a supervisory level is needed. With this
education, supervisors are better able to apply the techniques of transformational and
transactional leadership in order to achieve the benefits of safety performance and
compliance as well as employees who are proactive in improving the safety environment.
Safety and economics
The Lebeau, Duguay, and Boucher (2014) evaluated the cost of injuries in Quebec
between the years of 2005 and 2007. Included in the evaluation was considerations for
the suffering of the employee and the lost productivity of the employer. On an annual
basis, the study showed that employers lose 1.78 billion and employees suffer 2.84 billion
in losses, with the average loss around $40,000 per case. It is difficult and imprecise to
calculate doses, as assumptions are made that change across generations, genders and
family status. However, despite limitations, studies like this show the costs (likely
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underestimated) of occupational juries with the intent of highlighting the appropriate path
for research and injury prevention.
Data on the cost of fatalities is available, while the costs of serious injuries and
the lifelong impact of disability is under researched. It is for this reason that MarucciWellman et al., (2015) studied the occurrence of serious occupational injuries from 19982010 in the United States. The study showed that direct costs of these injuries was $600
billion, though while the number of cases reduced year over year, the costs did not. The
current study did not indicate if this is due to more severe injuries, an aging workforce or
more costly treatment.
As Serrier, Sultan-Taieb, Luce, and Bejean (2014), indicated, occupational safety
has "an impact on economic growth by affecting the labor supply, in particular through
the number of working days lost because of illness or accident and the reduced
productivity of employees at work" (p.661). The focus of the study was on the cost of
occupational lung cancer; more specifically, the cost by risk factor. While 2008 results
indicate that a case of occupational lung cancer costs approximately 62 million Euros, but
the results of this study helped to break down direct (medical bills) and indirect costs
(loss of productivity due to decreased morale grieving for co workers) cost by hazard.
Approximately 60-70% of occupational lung cancer is associated with asbestos exposure,
costing approximately 500,000 to 1.5 million Euros. The purpose of this study is
prevention.
Cancer is a disease that is still difficult to treat and that can have physical as well
as psychological repercussions. The occupational risk factors are generally
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‘‘avoidable’’ with technically feasible preventive measures being available,
whose implementation, however, depends on decisions made by individuals not
directly affected by these risks. In the particular context of occupational cancers,
it is ultimately more effective to prevent a cancer than to treat it. (Serrier, SultanTaieb, Luce and Bejean, 2014, p.671)
Research has showed that it makes good financial sense to invest in injury
prevention (Fabius, Thayer, Konicki, Yarborough, Peterson, Isaac, & Dreger, 2013).
Previous research has shown that for every dollar spent when an employee used
healthcare, an additional $2.13 was lost by the company. Thus, the authors hypothesized
that promoting a safe, healthy and wellness conscious working population would result in
improved productivity, increased profit and better stock performance. To test the
hypothesis, data from more than 10 years of CHAA award winners was reviewed. The
results showed that there is a correlation between organizations that promote wellness
and reduce health and safety risks outperform the market.
Summary and Conclusions
Each year United States’ occupational accidents result in the death of more than
4,600 individuals and the serious injury of nearly 5 million more (Hofmann et al., 2017).
These injuries result in hardships to the family of the employee and to the economy as
nearly $50 billion dollars is spent on direct medical costs alone (Marucci-Wellman et al.,
2015). The general problem is that a contributing cause in nearly 88% of occupational
incidents is unsafe behavior (Goh et al., 2018) affected by the attitudes and beliefs toward
safety due to a lack of management commitment to maintaining a positive safety culture
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(Zhang et al., 2018). In the example of the Deepwater Horizon incident, an oil rig fire
killed 11, injured 16 and cost $34 billion in medical claims and legal settlements (Reader
& O’Connor, 2014). This event demonstrates the association between leadership
acceptance of unsafe behaviors, unrealistic production expectations and the occurrence of
serious occupational incidents (Oudhuis & Tengblad, 2018). If safety is perceived as a
value by management and upheld, employees will perform work with safety in mind,
reducing injuries (Zacharatos et al., 2005). This is especially important when considering
that management is responsible for addressing conflicts between strategic goals such as
safety and production (Engemann & Scott, 2018).
The specific management problem is that executives use dynamic or on the fly
leadership methods (Gravina et al., 2017), which raises concerns about leaders’
interventions on safety culture and the implications of those interventions on safety
behaviors and work related accidents (Engemann & Scott, 2018). In the example of the
Deepwater Horizon catastrophe, employees were rewarded for cost cutting measures and
on time production delivery, not for safety performance (Smith, 2011). Bronkhorst et al.
(2018) identified the need for a study of interventions employed by management to
improve safety culture.
The purpose of this descriptive phenomenological research study was to describe
the effectiveness of the influence of executive interventions on the safety culture within
their organizations, as perceived by safety professionals. A greater understanding of how
safety professionals perceive interventions, the words and actions or voice, of executives
may allow for the development of training. The training could encourage executives to
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practice interventions that foster a positive safety culture that reduces occupational death
and injury. Safety professionals were asked to describe the interventions that have been
employed by executives in their organization and their perception of the effectiveness of
such interventions on the safety culture and voice of the organization.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
The purpose of this descriptive phenomenological research study was to describe
the effectiveness of the influence of executive interventions on the safety culture within
their organizations, as perceived by safety professionals. A greater understanding of how
safety professionals perceive interventions; the words and actions or voice, of executives
may allow for the development of training. The training could encourage executives to
practice interventions that foster a positive safety culture that reduces occupational death
and injury. Safety professionals were asked to describe the interventions that have been
employed by executives in their organization and their perception of the effectiveness of
such interventions on the safety culture and voice of the organization. The intent was to
capture the lived experience of the safety professionals, as suggested by Giorgi (2009).
This chapter will include a description of research design and rationale, the role of
the researcher, methodology, participant selection, and instrumentation. This chapter will
then introduce procedures for participant selection, data analysis plan, issues of
trustworthiness, ethical procedures, possible types of data sources and possible analytical
strategies.
Research Design and Rationale
The purpose of this qualitative, descriptive phenomenological research study was
to describe the effectiveness of the influence of executive interventions on the safety
culture within their organizations, as perceived by safety professionals. The central
research question was:
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RQ: What are the lived experience of safety professionals observing the
development of safety culture in their organization as impacted by the interventions of
executives?
The purpose of this descriptive phenomenological study was to describe how
executives effectively influence the safety culture within their organizations, as perceived
by safety professionals. Qualitative research is in alignment with Antonsen (2009), who
confirmed previous research suggesting that qualitative analysis of a safety culture may
be more appropriate than quantitative analysis. To understand the perception of cultural
interventions at executive levels of organizations, I interviewed safety professionals at
various organizations. I included Safety professionals as part of the research to address
recommendations highlighted by previous research indicating that executives may, when
questioned, respond in a manner which indicates that they exhibit the expected level of
safety engagement, as indicated by Flin (2003). The safety professional has unique
access to executive level employees, shop floor employees and all management levels in
between and has training, experience, and education to understand safety culture and
implications. Based on their experiences, the safety professional is uniquely positioned
to describe their perception of effectiveness of leader interventions on the safety culture
of the organization. This is also in alignment with Schein (1990) who expressed the
struggle to decipher artifacts of culture without an insider’s perspective. In my study, the
safety professional was the insider.
The participants in my study were asked to participate in interviews. The
interviews consisted of open-ended questions designed to elicit the safety professional’s
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perception of the effectiveness of interventions employed by executive levels of
management on improving the safety culture throughout the organization that they
represent. The names of the organizations that the safety professional participants
represent remained anonymous; as this information was not collected and was redacted
from the transcript if unintentionally provided by the participant.
The use of the phenomenological research method in my study is similar to other
phenomenological research conducted to understand the feelings and experiences of
others, within the realm of occupational health and safety. Høivik et al. (2009) conducted
a phenomenological study on the phenomenon of safety culture to produce a description
of safety culture at one facility. Chikudate (2009) conducted a phenomenological study
to describe the experiences of Japanese train companies and post incident learnings.
Burgoyne and Hodgson (1983) conducted phenomenological research on learnings of
management based on their experiences in the workplace. Catlette (2005) conducted a
phenomenological study on the lived experience of workplace violence survivors,
including their fears, actions within the workplace and recommended safety
improvements.
Role of the Researcher
As the researcher, I was an observer of the research. I have a relationship with
the professional organization that I utilized to recruit research participants. While I had
met professionally with some individuals who ultimately participated in the study, these
meetings have strictly been regarding discussions on how to improve the management of
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our safety programs. I do not hold an elected position within the organization and
therefore do not believe that the perception of influence existed.
Throughout the research, I made conscious efforts to eliminate my own, personal
bias. I have served as a safety professional for more than 12 years. Throughout my
professional career, I have seen leaders and executives who exhibited high levels of
safety commitment and low levels of safety commitment. I have seen the results of
leaders actions develop into positive and negative safety cultures. I have seen serious
injuries occur because of unsafe behaviors that were accepted or even praised when they
facilitated on-time project delivery. Due to my experience, I exercised caution and
understood my potential for bias, ensuring that it did not interfere with the collection of
data and completion of research. One of the ways in which I worked to eliminate bias
was through the data collection process. For example, I structured interview questions so
that all interviewees were asked the same questions. I asked additional questions to get to
the appropriate level of detailed response from participants. I recorded every interview
and transcribed every interview so that no words were lost in interpretation. I had also
completed a course on interviewing techniques and how to interpret and respond to body
language exhibited by interviewees.
Methodology
Several researchers have suggested that qualitative research is the most
appropriate method to evaluate safety culture. Antonsen (2009) confirmed previous
research suggesting that qualitative analysis of a safety culture may be more appropriate
than quantitative analysis. A limitation of the Bronkhorst et al. (2018) study indicated
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that there was no qualitative data collected on the interventions to understand the why
and the how of the effectiveness of the leaders’ intervention. Qualitative methods were
incorporated into my research in order to identify the interventions employed by
organizational executives and the impact on safety culture.
I combined purposeful sampling with the snowball method for identifying study
participants. I selected purposeful sampling in order to ensure the most efficient
collection of rich data for analysis, by selecting participants who are most familiar with
the phenomenon of the study. Purposeful sampling was also most appropriate because
this method helped to ensure the:
availability and willingness to participate, and the ability to communicate
experiences and opinions in an articulate, expressive, and reflective manner. In
contrast, probabilistic or random sampling is used to ensure the generalizability of
findings by minimizing the potential for bias in selection and to control for the
potential influence of known and unknown confounders. (Palinkas, et al., 2015,
p.2),
as indicated by Palinkas et al. (2015). To align with the purpose of this research,
purposeful sampling had been selected.
I utilized purposeful sampling to identify individuals who had education in the
field of occupational safety/engineering with at least 5 years of experience (2 of which
must be with current employer). As needed, I utilized the snowballing technique to
gather additional participants meeting these criteria.
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Participant Selection Logic
I recruited participants from a local chapter of a professional safety organization.
These individuals had roles and responsibilities for their employer that supported
occupational safety in the workplace. This ensured that they had current experience in
the safety profession. Additionally, participants had a bachelor’s (or higher) degree in
safety science or an engineering field. This ensured that there was a standard for formal
education among respondents. Participants had 5 years of experience in a safety role and
at least 2 years with their current employer. This requirement was to ensure that the
safety professional had the experience to evaluate the safety culture as it exists within
their organization and has had time to observe executives within the organization and the
actions that they take in order to impact the safety culture of their organization. As part
of the study, a participant could not discuss the safety culture of a previous employer, as
it is possible that their employment status could impact their perception of the safety
culture of that organization. A review of the resume, LinkedIn profile, or confirmation of
the participant was required in order to confirm degree achievement and length of
employment.
Approximately 20 participants were identified to participate in my study. I
identified these participants by first contacting the entire distribution of a Lehigh Valley
professional safety organization through their email distribution list. Members who
responded to the initial email I sent were contacted by email with additional information
on the nature and purpose of the study as expected time commitment, confidentiality, and
their ability to stop their participation at any time. As I was not able to identify a
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sufficient number of participants, the process was to be additionally conducted with the
Philadelphia Chapter of the same professional safety organization.
Saturation is an important part of the methodology of research. Without
saturation, it is not likely to meet quality standards for qualitative research (Saunders, et
al., 2018). Saturation occurs when no additional data is being obtained that is
contributing to the expansion of the theory (Saunders, et al., 2018). This is the point
where data collection ends and data analysis begins. The management program at
Walden states that sample size for phenomenological research is 20. Thus, the intended
sample size for my research was to be 20; unless saturation was reached first. Selecting a
sample size of 20 is aligned with past research. Research conducted by Mason (2010)
reviewed approximately 25 phenomenological studies. Of those studies, while the
highest recorded number of participants was 89, and the lowest was seven, the mean and
mode were 20 (Mason, 2010).
In order to ensure that a sample size of 20 was appropriate, I reviewed
phenomenological studies associated with culture and safety. In general, these studies
demonstrated that 20 participants were an appropriate minimum to establish (unless
saturation has been met, first).
I reviewed the following studies:


Currie and Richens (2009) conducted a phenomenological study utilizing
33 individuals associated with culture of safety in midwifery



Høivik, Moen, Mearns, & Haukelid (2009) conducted a phenomenological
study utilizing 31 individuals performing work in Norwegian
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manufacturing facilities in an assessment of environmental, health and
safety culture


Siemsen, Madsen, Pedersen, Michaelsen, Pedersen, Andersen, and
Østergaard (2012) conducted a phenomenological study utilizing 47
individuals focusing on the culture of patient safety



Brown, Middleton, Fereday, and Pincombe (2016) conducted a
phenomenological study utilizing 13 individuals to study cultural safety
for aboriginal women



Crowther and Smythe (2016) conducted a phenomenological study
utilizing 13 individuals to study safety for maternity in rural areas



Glenn, Stocker‐Schnieder, McCune, McClelland and King (2014)
conducted a phenomenological study utilizing 13 individuals to study
patient safety

While not all of the research reviewed focused specifically on a
phenomenological study associated with occupational safety culture development, each
focused on aspects of culture and safety in the workplace or community and I
determined the sample size to be comparable to the minimum number of participants
required in a safety culture phenomenological research in order to reach data saturation.
Instrumentation
For my qualitative research, interviews were conducted in order to generate an
understanding of the lived experience of the participants. The interviews were
semistructured, in order to ensure consistency between the interviews. The interview was
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semistructured in order to allow me to delve into the responses of the participants and ask
clarifying questions. I derived the semistructured interview questions from the tool
developed by Frazier, Ludwig, Whitaker, and Roberts (2013). Frazier et al. (2013)
conducted research on the assessment of safety culture of more than 25,000 individuals.
The results of the study were the identification of four primary impacts to safety culture:
the concern of management, personal responsibility, peer interactions with regards to
safety, and the management system associated with safety. I modified the questions
developed by Frazier et al. (2013) in order to identify not that these areas impact safety
culture but how executives can effectively influence safety culture in these categories.
Additionally, I incorporated questions to assess the safety culture of an
organization (those focused specifically on management actions) from the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) in order to identify the actions of management that
contributed most to improved safety culture. These questions are used by the NRC at
facilities following a serious safety or environmental incident to investigate the incident
(Reiman, 2004). A subset of the investigation of the incident is an investigation of the
occupational safety and environmental culture of the organization.
I incorporated these questions by comparing the response of participants to
determine which is the action that is successful most often in practice. In addition to
general questions about the organization, the questions included the following questions,
derived from previously developed questionnaires:
o How would you describe your interactions with executives and the
interactions of shop floor employees as it relates to the safety culture?
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o How would you describe the safety culture of the shop floor employees?
o Does management’s decisions regarding operational issues (such as
changes to the scope of work or response to operational events) reflect the
appropriate focus on safety? If so, please give examples. Does
management’s decisions regarding operational issues (such as changes to
the scope of work or response to operational events) reflect the appropriate
focus on safety? If so, please give examples.
o Provide examples of situations in which there was a perception of
management’s trade off/conflict between safety and production (e.g., there
was pressure to meet a schedule goal, but you or someone you know
identified a problem which would delay the work)? Have you ever run
into a situation like this? If so, what did you do? How did it work out?
o How would you describe the safety culture of the highest ranking officials
on the jobsite?
o How would you describe the leadership style of the highest ranking
official?
o What actions have been taken by the highest ranking officials to
effectively influence the safety culture at the jobsite and what where the
effects of those actions?
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
First, Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was obtained. This process
began during the URR review process, when Form A (Description of Data Sources and
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Partner Sites) was submitted to IRB. This form submission resulted in guidance provided
with regards to specific IRB submissions. Working with the IRB, the intent was to have
IRB approval shortly after proposal approval by URR. Recruitment occurred after
approval from IRB.
Following IRB approval, the informed consent process was followed. This
ensured that participants were fully educated on the process of the study before
participating. For my research, potential participants received initial communication on
the research via email. Participants then had the ability to call, text or email any
questions that they had regarding the study and their potential participation. After the
participants had been fully informed of the details of the study and their ability to remove
themselves from the study at any time, the informed consent of the participant was
obtained via signature or other electronic confirmation and retained.
The document utilized to document informed consent originated from Walden’s
sample consent form for adults. I modified this form to reflect the details of my research
and any relevant data. For example, information was included on the description of the
study, inclusion criteria for participants, the purpose of the study, study procedures
(including the potential time commitment of the participants), sample of interview
questions, reminder of the voluntary nature of the study, privacy, risks, contact
information of the researcher for question and obtaining consent.
After that time, recruitment began through a local safety professional
organization. I am a member of the national organization, as well as the Philadelphia and
Lehigh Valley, Pennsylvania chapters. Approximately 20 participants were identified.
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These participants were identified by first contacting the entire distribution of the Lehigh
Valley Chapter of a professional safety organization through their email distribution list.
Members who respond to the initial email were contacted by email with additional
information on the nature and purpose of the study as expected time commitment,
confidentiality and their ability to stop their participation at any time. As enough
participants were not identified, I attempted to continue the process with the Philadelphia
Chapter of the same professional safety organization. Each chapter had a large number
of members. In the city of Philadelphia alone, there were at least 70 members who would
have qualified to participate in the study.
Again, when the participants were identified, I obtained consent of the
participants, ensuring that they understood that they could withdraw their participation at
any time. Additionally, participants were informed that their participation is for research
only, all information that could point to a person or an organization would be kept strictly
confidential and the records will be kept only for the minimum length of time required by
the University; five years following completion of the dissertation.
Sampling would be completed after data saturation was reached, which was
expected to be ~20 participants. The first volunteers meeting the criteria were
interviewed; either in person or via a video chat application. I preferred face-to-face or
video chat as it allowed me to see the body language and facial expression of the
interviewee in order to gather the full response of the interviewee. For that reason, audio
only or email responses (for initial discussion) were not intended to be accepted. In order
to complete a thorough discussion, it was expected that each interview would last 60-90
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minutes. Subsequent interviews and/or follow up phone or email communications would
be requested to elaborate on response, if necessary.
The participants were intended to be requested to meet in a community location
that is convenient for them. The intent was that the participant would meet the researcher
at this time. The data was collected by the researcher. Each participant was intended to
be asked to meet in person on one occasion. It was expected that the series of questions
would take approximately 60-90 minutes. Participants were informed of the expected
timeframe, in advance. If any additional follow up was necessary, participants were
asked if they may be contacted via phone or email, rather than face to face. The
participant was asked to confirm that it is acceptable to collect a digital recording of the
interview. When the participant accepted, the interview progressed. Recording were
completed digitally through an application. The results of the interview were then
transcribed. At the conclusion of the study, a debrief was conducted with any interested
participants. They would be able to be provided with a copy of their transcript and will
be able to learn of the results of the study once finalized.
Data Analysis Plan
The responses from the interviewees to the open ended interview questions were
recorded, then transcribed, then reviewed for accuracy with the interviewee, if desired.
Any misstatements or misrepresentations were corrected. Specifically, the researcher
utilized the transcription feature built in to Webex to record most interviews. This
transcription was reviewed by the researcher, and compared to the digital recording of the
interview. Any errors in transcription by the transcription service were documented.
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Upon final review of the transcription, the participant was offered a copy of the
transcribed interview.
Once the data was confirmed to have been properly transcribed, it was analyzed.
To do so, a chart was established, as has been the case by several other descriptive
phenomenological research studies. In this chart, the researcher placed the words utilized
by the participant in one column and transformed in the second column to what the
participant meant; as interpreted by the researcher both in words, actions and responses.
The ultimate goal of the chart was to identify the meaning of the experience of the
interviewee as it relates to the phenomena.
The meaning of the experience of each participant was reviewed to determine
trends in the information to ensure the research question was addressed, associated with
the lived experience of safety professionals observing the development of safety culture
in their organization, as impacted by the interventions of executives. There was no
software utilized to code the data; only hand coding was employed. This allowed the
experience of the researcher, who is also a safety professional, to understand and interpret
the potential jargon utilized, similarities in the jargon used and interpret the meaning
behind the examples provided by each participant.
Coding was employed in order to describe trends in the data. The transcript of the
participant conversations was reviewed. The spoken word, transcribed, was then
compared to the emotions, non verbal cues and body language of the participant, as
observed by the researcher. Outlying trends in data were captured and expressed as
outlying data.
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Issues of Trustworthiness
Credibility
In order to ensure reliability of data, all interviews were digitally recorded, with
the permission of the interviewee. The interview was then be fully transcribed by an
transcription service. The results of the transcription services were reviewed by the
researcher for accuracy; as compared to the digitally recorded interview. The interviewee
was offered a copy of the transcript, if interested. The purpose of the member checking
of the transcript was to ensure that the statements from the participant were not
misinterpreted.
Additionally, interviews continued until data saturation was reached. At a
minimum, 20 interviews were intended to be conducted in alignment with the Walden
management expectation for phenomenological research. As stated previously, the mean
number of interviews to reach data saturation has been observed to be approximately 20.
Therefore, the intent was to conduct approximately 20 interviews until no new data was
being presented, but only trends in data are being observed; as data saturation had been
reached.
Transferability
A limitation to the study is the transferability of the study outside of the research
population. There will be generalities that apply; however, the study describes what was
determined to be most effective safety interventions implemented by the leaders of the
organizations represented by the research participants. In order to determine applicability
outside of the research participants, the context of the research is provided, in detail. This
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will allow readers to determine applicability outside of the research population and will
also assist in ensuring dependability of the study.
Dependability
To ensure that the study can be replicated in the future, there will be good
documentation of the semistructured interview questions, of participant selection and
qualifications.
Confirmability
The researcher built trust with the participants in order to ensure the most open
and honest responses to interview questions. This trust was built first by explaining the
interview process. This includes that consent of the participants will be obtained,
ensuring that they understand that they may withdraw their participation at any time.
Additionally, participants were informed that their participation is for research only, all
information that could point to a person or an organization will be kept strictly
confidential and the records will be kept only as long as required by the University; a
minimum of 5 years following the completion of the dissertation. All interviews were
recorded, with the permission of the interviewee. The interview was then fully
transcribed. The interviewee were offered a copy of the transcript, if interested. This
ensured that the statements from the participant are not misinterpreted. This additional
step in the process was to ensure data reliability, but also to gain the trust of the
participant; so that they understand the research is not attempting to manipulate their
words, feelings or expressions in order to ensure that the results of the study align with
the purpose of the study.
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Ethical Procedures
This research followed all requirements of Walden’s IRB. Research did not begin
and participants were not recruited until IRB approval was provided for the research.
First, Form A was submitted to IRB as the URR reviewed the proposal for the research.
Once feedback on next steps were provided by IRB, the appropriate ethical concerns
were fully addressed. With approval of the proposal followed by IRB approval,
Walden’s consent form, a copy included below, was modified for the proposed research
and was used as part of the volunteer recruiting process. This process ensured that
participants were fully educated on the process of the study before participating. For the
research, participants received initial communication on the research via email.
Participants then had the ability to call, text or email any questions that they had
regarding the study and their participation. After the participants had been fully informed
of the details of the study and their ability to remove themselves from the study at any
time, the informed consent of the participant was obtained via signature or by electronic
means and retained. With regards to risk to participants, the risk was not expected to be
greater than any other normal life activity. The research did not collect information
intentionally from any sensitive populations and only collected information from those
over the age of 21. Data collected will remain secure and will only be maintained for the
minimum time required by the University; 5 years beyond the completion of the
dissertation. Data security during that time will be ensured via a password protected
document repository. Participant names are not associated with data collected. Any
inadvertent mention of names of employees or organizations themselves were redacted
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from the notes and transcripts from the interviews. The data will only be accessible to
myself and my dissertation committee. Data will not be made available outside of the
Walden University community.
Summary
The research was initiated by conducting interviews with individuals from the
United States, representing many different types of organizations (private and public,
high and low hazard) in different sectors (service industry, manufacturing, healthcare,
etc.), to fill a research gap indicated by Fruhen et al. (2013).
The data was collected in the form of individual interviews, which allowed the
participant to describe the interventions employed by executive managers within the
organization and their perceptions of those interventions. The interviews were conducted
with safety professionals supporting the organization, as to provide a perspective from an
individual who understands the importance of safety, how to identify concerns and how
to correct hazards. These safety professionals have worked with a facility for at least 2
years, to ensure that they have had the ability to understand the safety culture of the
organization. To analyze the data, a system of coding needed to be developed. The
coding helped to identify trends and make general discoveries on the phenomena, which
is safety culture. I identified themes and deviations from themes. The themes addressed
the research questions and are intended to add to the body of knowledge associated with
safety culture.
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Chapter 4: Results
The purpose of this qualitative descriptive phenomenological research study was
to describe the effectiveness of executive interventions on the safety culture within their
organizations, as perceived by safety professionals. A greater understanding of how
safety professionals perceive executive interventions; such as words, actions, or voice,
may allow for improved development of training. The training could encourage
executives to practice interventions that foster a positive safety culture that reduces
occupational death and injury. I asked safety professionals to describe the interventions
that have been employed by executives in their organization and their perception of the
effectiveness of such interventions on the safety culture and voice of the organization.
The intent was to capture the lived experience of the safety professionals, as identified by
Giorgi (2009).
The central research question was: What are the lived experiences of safety
professionals observing the development of safety culture in their organization as
impacted by the interventions of executives?
In this chapter, I will address the research setting and demographics for the
research. I will also address data collection, data analysis, evidence of trustworthiness
and the study results.
Research Setting
The IRB approval to complete this study as originally designed, was received in
the first quarter of 2020. This is approximately the time that COVID-19 began to impact
the world. Initially, the greatest impact remained in Asia before migrating to Europe. In
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the February timeframe, I was able to attend a single, local meeting of the safety
professional organization and request participants from the approximately 12 attendees.
Turnout was exceptionally low, likely due to winter weather, and the participants that
attended the meeting and met the criteria outlined in the study were even lower.
In mid-March 2020, the COVID-19 impact to the United States became so
significant that schools began to shut down. Workplaces mandated that nonessential
employees to work from home. Restaurants and public locations were shut down.
Additionally, biosafety officers (those that run biological safety programs for companies)
were on the forefront of protecting workplaces from COVID-19 outbreaks. Typically,
the biosafety officer is a role held by a safety professional, the key participant in this
study. The availability of participants, the closure of workplaces and public locations
(such as restaurants, where the study interviews were intended to be collected),
necessitated that I request changes to the study, that had previously been approved by the
IRB.
Therefore, the new proposal that was reviewed and approved included the ability
to conduct electronic-based rather than face-to-face interviews with participants. Due to
the limited availability of safety professionals to participate in this study, the request also
included the ability to request participants via electronic means, such as LinkedIn.
Electronic recruiting via LinkedIn began in April and continued through July
2020. A post requesting participants was made on the American Society of Safety
Professionals page as well as the Board of Certified Safety Professionals. At the time of
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the posting, I provided prospective participants with high-level details of the study as
well as the informed consent document, containing my contact information.
Demographics
I proposed to use purposeful sampling as part of this research, to identify
individuals who had education in the field of occupational safety/engineering with at least
5 years of experience (2 of which must have been with the current employer), and the
snowballing technique, if needed. I intended to select the participants from members of a
local safety professional organization but ultimately extended the invitation to qualifying
participants through Board of Certified Safety Professionals (BCSP) membership, as
well. This change was exclusively due to the lack of availability of a sufficient number
of local safety professionals, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. All individuals
participating in the study were actively engaged in or had roles and responsibilities for
their employer that support occupational safety in the workplace. Participants had a
bachelor’s (or higher) degree in safety science or an engineering field, as well as 5 years
of experience in a safety role and at least 2 years with their current employer. All
participants worked within the United States, and primarily supported manufacturing
operations. Confirmation of meeting the conditions of the study were obtained by
LinkedIn postings or verbal/written confirmation by the participant and all participant
information remained confidential. The participants were both male and female, with
various levels of experience as a safety professional.
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Data Collection
In total, I conducted the study with 15 participants; a number identified as
saturation was reached. More than 20 participants had expressed interest to participate,
however, those that did not attend the interview at the agreed upon time or even respond
to a proposed interview time were not involved in the study.
The study was initially approved by the IRB to conduct in-person interviews by
recruiting safety professionals from the Allentown and Philadelphia chapters of a local
safety professional organization. However, due to availability of local safety
professionals associated with their involvement in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic,
recruiting of safety professionals occurred not only through the Allentown chapter, but
nationally via LinkedIn. In order to recruit via LinkedIn., the request for participants was
posted to the national ASSP page on LinkedIn as well as the page for the Board of
Certified Safety Professionals. I provided all prospective participants with the informed
consent form at the time of the posting, as well as personally via LinkedIn messaging
services or via email.
I intended for the study to be conducted through in-person interviews. However,
due to the COVID-19 pandemic, public meeting locations, including the intended
interview location, had been closed. Therefore, I employed an electronic means of
conducting and recording interviews. I conducted the majority of interviews using
WebEx and associated video. However, due to the quality of some participant’s home
internet (as many professionals were working from home), video was not always an
option. Additionally, some participants could only participate via the phone. A few
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individuals who were on the front-line of fighting the COVID-19 pandemic were
involved in brief conversations followed by lengthy email responses; based on their
availability.
For interviews conducted via Webex, I recorded the Webex and generated a
transcript. For interviews conducted by phone, I recorded the interview and a transcript
was typed based on the recordings. For email conversations, I have retained the emails.
Regardless of method of communication, all data were stored on a password protected
laptop. No print materials were collected.
I intended for interview to take 30-60 minutes. However, there was a significant
range in the length of interviews, which was generally based on the level of detail
provided by the interviewee as well as additional questions asked by the interviewee
regarding the study and follow-up. One interview lasted approximately 20 minutes, and
several exceeded 1 hour (with the interviewee’s permission).
I utilized open-ended questions in order to fully allow the participants to share
their experiences and added additional, follow-up questions when checking for
understanding was necessary or to expand upon the participants initial thought. In some
cases, participants answered multiple questions as they provided their response to the first
question. Therefore, I did not ask those subsequent questions again in the course of the
interview.
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Data Analysis
I collected data from the interviews, which were then transcribed and hand-coding
was employed. I completed this task by compiling all transcripts into Microsoft Word
and searching for common words and phrases among the participant responses. I
employed the theming of data, as indicated by Saldina (2015). When common words and
phrases were identified, I highlighted those words in a specific color. The common
words and phrases that I identified became associated with common themes and then the
recommendations of Saldina (2015) were utilized to categorize the data “according to
commonality and ordered in superordinate and subordinate outline format to reflect on
their possible groupings and relationships” (Saldina, 2015, p. 178).
Interview questions to safety professionals regarding their lived experience with
executives and the development of safety culture resulted in data saturation and the
emergence of the common themes (see Figure 1). These themes addressed the research
question: What are the lived experiences of safety professionals observing the
development of safety culture in their organization as impacted by the interventions of
executives (see Figure 2).
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Engagement

Ownership

Executive
Impact

Trust

Integration

Figure 1. Common themes associated with executive impact

Theme

Subthemes

Engagement

Executives
engaging with
employees
Executives
providing money to
support safety
initiative

Participant Statement

An example statement from a participant regarding
executive leadership: “He always does safety first in
his presentation.”
An example statement from a participant regarding
executive leadership: “Everybody's going home
when it was too hot to work… everybody was
..grateful and happy…that they weren't losing any
pay.”
Executives
An example statement from a participant regarding
conducting physical executive leadership: “They definitely made more
site walkthroughs
trips out to the plant, and they were based in
Chicago so that was a big deal for the hourly
employees to see, like oh, so, and so's coming out to
visit us you know, we gotta clean up.”
Executives care
An example statement from a participant regarding
executive leadership: “They really do care and
about my safety so I'm gonna be on the look out.”
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Integration

Trust

Obvious lack of
engagement when
safety isn’t a
priority to
executives
Executive
integrated safety
into business
operations
Not blaming
employees

Trusting
recommendations
of safety
professional
Ownership

Shop floor
ownership of safety

An example statement from a participant regarding
executive leadership: “Like, we need production is
more important. We need to get [product] out the
door. That's what's making us money kind of thing.”
An example statement from a participant regarding
executive leadership: “…safety being part of every
conversation with leadership and integrating safety
into the overall business.”
An example statement from a participant regarding
executive leadership: “We want to improve this
process, so this doesn't happen someone in the future
and that resonated with this young person strongly.
They were very forthcoming. They said, Here's
some things I can see that I did wrong…”
An example statement from a participant regarding
executive leadership: “Because he's supported
safety, I was able to bring on a health physicist. I
was able to bring on a bio safety, human subject,
testing expert. I was able to bring in a couple
additional engineers. I probably tripled the staff.”
An example statement from a participant regarding
executive leadership: “And then if it worked, right,
then there's a bottom up effect, and you, you start to
develop culture and you have the basis for a good
program.”

Figure 2. Themes surrounding development of safety culture

There were outliers reported by participants that were not aligned with the common
words, phrases and themes highlighted by the other participants. These outliers
originated from a participant who worked for a federal employer. Federal employers are
not required to comply with federal workplace regulations, such as OSHA. Therefore,
there is a significant difference between a federal employer choosing not to follow an
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OSHA regulation and a private industry employer willfully outside of OSHA compliance.
The implications to the safety culture would be significantly different. For that reason,
statements surrounding a choice not to follow regulations was omitted from the results of
the study. For this reason, further investigation into the culture of Federal employers and
the development of culture would be interesting. The following quotes support these
statements:


They, they can choose to follow OSHA when convenient.



When employees are required to do or participate (or not do or participate)
according to specific verbiage in a contract, this may require a different approach
to the development of safety culture.
Evidence of Trustworthiness

Credibility
In order to ensure reliability of data, I digitally recorded all interviews, with the
permission of the interviewee. I then ensured that the interviews were fully transcribed
by a transcription service. I reviewed the results of the transcription services for accuracy
as compared to the digitally recorded interview. There were no changes to the proposed
process with the execution of the study, with one exception. In one case, the recordings
were nearly inaudible. Therefore, the notes that I had taken electronically were utilized
for trending in this study.
Additionally, I intended to continue interviews until data saturation was reached.
Walden University expects a minimum of 20 interviews will be conducted in for
phenomenological research. However, I reached data saturation was before 20 interviews
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were conducted. Therefore, the with no new data is being presented, but only a
continuation of trends in data being observed, data saturation was identified, and I
stopped the interviews at 15.
Transferability
A limitation to the study is the transferability of the study outside of the research
population. There will be generalities that apply; however, the study described what was
determined to be most effective safety interventions implemented by the leaders of the
organizations represented by the research participants. In order to determine applicability
outside of the research participants, the context of the research will be provided, in detail.
This will allow readers to determine applicability outside of the research population and
will also assist in ensuring dependability of the study.
Transferability is enhanced by ensuring data saturation was reached.
Dependability
To ensure that the study can be replicated in the future, there is good
documentation of the semistructured interview questions, of participant selection and
qualifications.
Confirmability
I established trust with the participants in order to ensure the most open and
honest responses to interview questions. This trust was first built by explaining the
interview process. This includes that consent of the participants will be obtained,
ensuring that they understand that they may withdraw their participation at any time.
Additionally, participants were informed that their participation is for research only, all
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information that could point to a person or an organization will be kept strictly
confidential and the records will be kept only as long as required by the University; a
minimum of 5 years following the completion of the dissertation. All interviews were
recorded, with the permission of the interviewee. The interview was then fully
transcribed. The interviewee was offered a copy of the transcript, if interested. This
ensured that the statements from the participant are not misinterpreted. This additional
step in the process was to ensure data reliability, but also to gain the trust of the
participant; so that they understand the research is not attempting to manipulate their
words, feelings or expressions in order to ensure that the results of the study align with
the purpose of the study.
Study Results
The purpose of this qualitative descriptive phenomenological research study was
to describe the effectiveness of executive interventions on the safety culture within their
organizations, as perceived by safety professionals. A greater understanding of how
safety professionals perceive executive interventions, such as words, actions, or voice,
may allow for improved development of training. The training could encourage
executives to practice interventions that foster a positive safety culture that reduces
occupational death and injury. Safety professionals were asked to describe the
interventions that have been employed by executives in their organization and their
perception of the effectiveness of such interventions on the safety culture and voice of the
organization in order to address the central research question of “What are the lived
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experiences of safety professionals observing the development of safety culture in their
organization as impacted by the interventions of executives?”
The result of completing the interviews, transcribing the interviews, hand coding
and identifying trends resulted in the ability to answer the research question. Safety
professionals indicate that executives impact safety culture through their engagement,
trust, integration and ownership of safety.
Themes and word or phrase patterns are listed in tables in order to identify the
repeated and collective terms utilized by participants in their interview responses. The
themes of engagement, trust, integration and ownership of safety are present in the tables
as well as specific quotes from participants. The table below is formatted in this manner
in order to allow for a clear interpretation and understanding of the thematic alignment
based on the exact statements from participants (see Table 1).

Table 1
Participant Statements Surrounding Development of Safety Culture
Subtheme
Participant Quotes
Theme
Engagement Executives
engaging with
employees









he always does safety first in his presentation.
So, it's always at the front of the mindset of
everyone that safety comes first.
and the partner drove the safety culture at that
firm and he was a hands on person he got
involved in discussions with folks that they
had concerns down to the entry level folks.
So, he was fully engaged on a personal level.
I'm not sure if that's an artifact of the size of
the company or that. It's based in a kind of a,
it's based in Seattle, which is a little bit more.
I don't know if you want to call it.
If I want a positive example, it's, they're
engaged.
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And have the ability to you're talking at that
executive level, you're talking at that shop for
level. It's just a unique perspective. But but
again, pretty much everybody's everyone is
saying, the same thing can be like, yeah,
they're out there. They're engaged. They're
having the conversations.
So, from a numbers perspective, the first year,
we went from a thirty to a ten, second year.
We went from a ten to a four and the second
year is when we implemented those, those
more engagement type programs.
He individually went out and made sure that
he had done an individual audit on every
single worker there and spoke to every single
one there…
He was modeling the right behavior in more
than one person out there in the plant
With a real focus on working directly with the
shop floor folks themselves.
Safety is emphasized very highly to the
employees and it is how they start every day.
Because at the time their VP or executive
director attended safety committee meetings,
And by, by all means, you know, he, he she
doesn't have to take all the safety trainings,
but it's it demonstrate the importance to the
bench level person.
So, he would really be engaged and then the
word gets out. Oh, [he’s] coming to my lab.
so he would engage all levels.
And he was very engaged, right? So, I flew
over there, worked with the team. We did the
incident evaluation. We looked for corrective
actions so so he was involved.
Can I say engage? Yeah. Yeah, sure. Engage,
engage.
he would engage in a quite with passionate
way. I'll say he wouldn't be afraid to do it.
Therefore, I also think there is a direct
correlation between leadership being engaged
in safety in the workplace and holding it as a
value at the top of the organization and
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having a good safety culture on the shop
floor.
Executives
providing money to
support safety
initiative



















Everybody's going home when it was too hot
to work… everybody was ..grateful and
happy about…that they weren't losing any
pay.
I was on site and they did one thing, I would
say that I thought it was pretty remarkable
when there was no or mass available they did
secure masks for people to wear one
And for the hours worked and everything, it
was a ridiculous number. So they
implemented the safe start program. I'm not
sure if you've heard of or not, but it's a
behavioral safety program
it really is remarkable because it's obviously
costs money to implement a system like that.
They also gave us money to get T shirts with
[our safey] saying on them and our safety
logo with the [company reference] and they
always talk about it.
we've paid half a million dollars for masks
and other supplies,
So that if people didn't feel safe going home,
where they felt like, they were gonna take
something home to their families, they could
stay in the hotel for few weeks. That's very
generous. That, that I certainly appreciate.
They're putting their money where their
mouth mouth is, you know, and then it's on
the other side. It's like, is that they're all about
numbers just get the job done.
Anchored the programs onto an existing run
rate routine.
they'll put their money where their mouth is,
and they treat their HS person. Like, they're
the most valuable person on the staff.
I got approval to get an expat assignment over
in China, which was so much costs the
company, a ton of money. So he approved it.
He's like, if you say, that's the right person
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Executives
conducting physical
site walkthroughs

that should go, we're gonna put this person
over there, right?
The executive put money into fixing what the
team identified as needs, allowed the team
time to accomplish the actions and tracked
progress.












Executives care



They definitely made more trips out to the
plant, and they were based in Chicago so
that was a big deal for the hourly
employees to see, like oh, so, and so's
coming out to visit us you know, we gotta
clean up.
So one of the things that he did that, I
thought was was impactful, was that, you
know, he started a gemba walk routine
even though the leadership team really
didn't have a whole lot of concept about
what gamble was and what it was again.
And he also talk to the people on the floor
while he was, he was going through that
walk.
and talk to people as he walked through
with no plant manager with him no
managers with him. No. Engineers with
them.
So we started doing weekly walk about in
the labs.
So but we called we call these leader
leadership, walk about, right? And so one
thing we would do is we would focus on
observable conditions. Right? So you can
get that from a checklist.
We have developed an audit schedule for
our leadership to walk the shop floors and
discuss safety with our front-line
employees and ensure they are visible to
the workforce
that's really important to people that are
working for a living. Right? I mean, you
know, we can send you home and not tell
you then your family doesn't need. So
yeah, so that's big big thing there…. it
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Lack of engagement
is obvious when
safety isn’t a
priority to
executives




said a lot to me about his commitment to
the safety
Yeah, so them putting the ownership back
on them and then saying, you know, we
do value your safety. What are you going
to do to work safely every day?
And it showed them more that they cared
by coming out to visit and talking to them
and actually going out on the floor and
just instead of just staying up in the office
area.
the temperature checks in the lobby,
They do care about our health and safety
and even though we have to stay open and
we have to keep running while everyone's
quarantined at home,
he made a point to show that he's
personally invested in folks safety.
and then everyone felt that he cared about
them.
He got to know them by name
They really do care and about my safety
so I'm gonna be on the look out
someone who cared who care about
people care about safety
So, when you have someone who is pure
in their motives, they're doing it because
they care, because they, they understand
the risk and they don't want people to get
hurt and compliance means something to
them.
but they're going to emulate if he cares
about it or she cares about it.
The conversation is more of “let me tell
you why this is important, because we
care about you”.
So, even if it's not actual pressure, they
may perceive that they have to get a job
done.
I mean, I literally got left out of the trailer
and I got told this whole well, these are
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men work here and all this kinda kids
most stuff. And I'm going like.
that's what they want is they want stuff to
get done at any cost.
You know, if they think that they're, you
don't care, there's just a number, and
you're just trying to get another, you
know, pill out or another viable vaccine.
You know, that that's where some of the
the bad stuff happens.
Due to geogrphic proximity to the
facility… “so he was kind of removed
from it and the executives didn't really
have a huge emphasis on safety”
Like, we need production is more
important. We need to get [product] out
the door. That's what's making us money
kind of thing.
it was more punitive. It was more stick
and carrot.
The leader the leader before was very,
you know, and it's, it's very cliche, but the
blame and punish culture.
The things kept getting deferred and
postponed, and then they had an
employee get hurt. Pretty significantly.
Deadlines were over-riding safety
And in the the rush to address, and on the
medical need, I have senior leaders who
are saying, we're not gonna do that.
We'll just drum waste. It's too expensive.
It's gonna take too long.
Safety top priority until, until we're late
on project deliverables. And then it takes
a back seat and so we would try to run
them down every year.
So again it's production and timeline to
some senior leaders out weigh the safety
component.
leadership looked at safety as a roadblock
to their production quota’s but in turn
preached safety at various meetings in the
workplace
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Integration

Executive integrated
safety into business
operations



if you have a work force who continually
raises risks/safety issues and they are not
followed up on you will quickly lose buy
in from the ground floor workers because
they will view safety as a lost cause being
that if leadership or management don’t
view it as a value/priority then why
should they.



<<After identifying successes and
improvements in incidents>> And, and I
would go to try to make changes or
tweaks to the program. They'd be like no,
no, no this is what we want. We want to
keep doing this this is working for us and
when we go out to do it, because workers
don't run away from us.
And then if it worked, right, then there's a
bottom up effect, and you, you start to
develop culture and you have the basis for
a good program.
safety being part of every conversation
with leadership and integrating safety into
the overall business
Heart safety culture in general is, when
people are over supervised, people don't
trust their professionalism a stand over
top of them.
I'm so sorry this happened to you we want
to get you the care. You need, let's make
sure that you are fine first, and then we'll
figure out what we can do better down
down the road. You know, it's it's a
collaborative effort.
We want to improve this process, so this
doesn't happen someone in the future and
that resonated with this young person
strongly. They were very forthcoming.
They said, Here's some things I can see
that I did wrong.
The question was always, why did you
have to do the hot work to begin with?




Trust

Not blaming
employees (testing
the system)
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Trusting
recommendations of
safety professional








Ownership

Shop floor
ownership of safety





We were not going to blame that person
for the event.
It was, it was always found to be
something that could have been or should
have been improved and the design or the
maintenance of the equipment, or the type
of activity.
So but we called we call these leader
leadership, walk about, right? And so one
thing we would do is we would focus on
observable conditions. Right? So you can
get that from a checklist.
I told him what was happening that if you
wanted a fake Dowdy heat, exhaustion or
heat stroke, that, that that was gonna
happen on these series of days. And
basically, what happened was the, he
called whoever he had a call when they
base the word down. And next thing I
know they're come out and they're telling
everybody okay.
So, we're not doing that anymore if we're
gonna renovate the area and purchase a
new system, we're gonna purchase it to
the new standards. We're not gonna do it
the way we used to because you didn't
have an answer. So it's just another
example.
He trusted me implicitly, and he would
back me up the confidence that gave me
Because he's supported safety, I was able
to bring on a health physicist. I was able
to bring on a bio safety, human subject,
testing expert. I was able to bring in a
couple additional engineers. I probably
tripled the staff.
Like, what are you gonna do to work
safely every day and make sure that you
go home safely? So, I thought that was
kinda of a cool program, and it definitely
changed the mindset.
So that gave the power back to the folks,
the hourly folks
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on the shop floor, they see that it's a
different message and they're gonna,
they're not gonna they're not gonna follow
the safety professionals message. They're
gonna follow the big person's message.
And then if it worked, right, then there's a
bottom up effect, and you, you start to
develop culture and you have the basis for
a good program
And when you have people who are
wearing them, and people who aren't
wearing them, and you say, well, why
aren't you wear your safety glasses? And
they say, well, nobody cares, you know,
it's a gauge. It's a gauge where you're at.

There were outliers reported by participants that were not aligned with the common
words, phrases and themes highlighted by the other participants. These outliers
originated from a participant who worked for a federal employer. Federal employers are
not required to comply with federal workplace regulations, such as OSHA. Therefore,
there is a significant difference between a federal employer choosing not to follow an
OSHA regulation and a private industry employer willfully outside of OSHA compliance.
The implications to the safety culture would be significantly different. For that reason,
statements surrounding a choice not to follow regulations was omitted from the results of
the study. For this reason, further investigation into the culture of Federal employers and
the development of culture would be interesting. The following quotes support these
statements:


They, they can choose to follow OSHA when convenient.
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When employees are required to do or participate (or not do or participate)
according to specific verbiage in a contract, this may require a different approach
to the development of safety culture.
Summary
Safety professionals were asked to describe the interventions that have been

employed by executives in their organization and their perception of the effectiveness of
such interventions on the safety culture and voice of the organization in order to address
the central research question of “What are the lived experiences of safety professionals
observing the development of safety culture in their organization as impacted by the
interventions of executives?” The intent of this research question was to describe the
effectiveness of executive interventions on the safety culture within their organizations,
as perceived by safety professionals. The result of completing the interviews,
transcribing the interviews, hand coding and identifying trends resulted in the ability to
answer the research question. Safety professionals indicate that executives impact safety
culture through their engagement, trust, integration and ownership of safety.
Chapter 5 will review then interpret the findings, discuss limitations of the study,
implications for future research and finally, the social implications of the study.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The purpose of this qualitative descriptive phenomenological study was to
describe executive effectiveness in influencing the safety culture within their
organizations, as perceived by safety professionals. To understand the perception of
cultural interventions at executive levels of organizations, I interviewed safety
professionals at various organizations. The safety professional has unique access to
executive level employees, shop floor employees, and all management levels in between
and has training, experience, and education to understand safety culture and implications.
Based on experiences, safety professionals are uniquely positioned to describe their
perceptions of effectiveness of leader interventions on the safety culture of the
organization.
I included open-ended questions in the interviews, designed to elicit the safety
professional’s perception of the effectiveness of interventions employed by executive
levels of management on improving the safety culture. The data were then analyzed by
creating a written transcript, conducting coding to identify themes in the responses of
participants. Safety professionals indicated that executives impacted safety culture
through their engagement, trust, integration and ownership of safety.
Interpretation of Findings
Nearly 5,000 employees die each year in the United States as the result of
occupational injury. A contributing cause in nearly 88% occupational incidents is unsafe
behavior (Goh et al., 2018) affected by the attitudes and beliefs toward safety due to a
lack of management commitment to maintaining a positive safety culture (Zhang et al.,
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2018). However, executives use dynamic or on the fly leadership methods (Gravina et
al., 2017) which raises concerns about leaders’ interventions on safety culture and the
implications of those interventions on safety behaviors and work-related accidents
(Engemann & Scott, 2018). Therefore, Bronkhorst et al. (2018) identified the need for a
study of interventions employed by management to improve safety culture. Additionally,
the studies below proposed future research be conducted in the area of safety leadership:


The results of Mullen, Kelloway, and Teed (2017), a study utilizing social
exchange theory framework, indicate that future research is needed to assess the
impact of the interventions that can improve safety leadership and encourage
employee safety behaviors to prevent incidents.



Pilbeam et al. (2016) found that the relationship between the front-line supervisor
and their direct reports have been studied, while other leadership relationships
(such as senior managers) that set the tone for safety culture within their
organizations are in need of investigation.



Fruhen et al. (2014) suggested that senior leaders had significant influence on
safety culture but did not explain which characteristics of the senior leader had the
greatest effect.



A limitation of the Michael et al. (2006) study was associated with not collecting
information from the perspective of the safety professional, but rather senior
leaders, the supervisor or shop floor employees; measuring themselves.
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The purpose of this descriptive phenomenological research study was to describe
the effectiveness of the influence of executive interventions on the safety culture within
their organizations, as perceived by safety professionals. A greater understanding of how
safety professionals perceive interventions; the words and actions or voice, of executives
may allow for the development of training. The training could encourage executives to
practice interventions that foster a positive safety culture that reduces occupational death
and injury. I conducted this research with the intent of filling gaps in previous research
or recommendations for future research from several recent studies.
In order to address the needs identified in previous studies, the framework for this
study drew upon the theory of planned behavior and social exchange theory. Ajzen’s
(1991) theory of planned behavior suggests that employee behavior is based on the norms
accepted by significant individuals in the organization. Montano and Kasprzyk (2015)
proposed the use of the theory of planned behavior in conjunction with the theory of
planned action in order to consider accepted norms as well as attitudes, behaviors and
feelings of control. These theories are applicable to safety culture as employee safety
attitude and behavior have been found to be influenced by an organization's safety
culture, which is based on the organization's beliefs and attitude toward safety (Choudhry
et al., 2007).
Social exchange theory indicates that if employees perceive that the company is
concerned with their well being, employees will work to benefit the company (Blau,
1964). When applying social exchange theory to occupational safety, the theory suggests
that if safety is seen as a concern, employees will comply with safety requirements, with
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exchanges influencing safety culture as described by Reader, Mearns, Lopes and Kuha
(2017). This is echoed by Zacharatos et al. (2005) who found that if safety is perceived
as a value by management and upheld, employees will perform work with safety in mind.
The perception of management commitment to safety predicts behavior (Zohar &
Polachek, 2014).
I conducted this research in order to focus on the perception of the effectiveness
of executive interventions on the safety culture of the organization. This study addressed
a limitation of the Michael et al. (2006) study, by collecting information from the
perspective of the safety professional; not senior leaders, the supervisor or shop floor
employees measuring themselves. This study focused on the attitude and commitment of
the senior leader through their interactions with their organization’s safety professional.
This research was conducted is in alignment with Fruhen et al. (2014) who suggested
researching the views of other employees in the organizational hierarchy. The research
intended to fill an additional gap by identifying which characteristics, at the senior
manager organizational levels, have been identified as having the greatest impact on
safety culture and safety performance, as identified by Fruhen et al. (2014).
Finally, this study is intended to begin to fill the gap identified by Bronkhorst et
al. (2018), Mullen, Kelloway, and Teed (2017), Pilbeam et al. (2016), Fruhen et al. (2014
and Michael et al. (2006), by identifying the observed interventions of leaders and the
impact of those interventions, as observed by the safety professional supporting the
organization.
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I identified that executives impact safety culture through their engagement, trust,
integration and ownership of safety. More specifically, executives can influence safety
culture by the following means:


Executives engaging with employees



Executives providing money to support safety initiative



Executives conducting physical site walkthroughs



Executives demonstrating care



Obvious lack of engagement when safety isn’t a priority to executives



Executive integrated safety into business operations



Not blaming employees



Trusting recommendations of safety professional



Shop floor ownership of safety
Limitations of the Study

In the initial development of this study, I identified a limitation associated with
the transferability of the study outside of the research population. This limitation still
holds true, after the completion of the study. While there are certainly generalities that
apply, the study will show what was determined to be the most effective safety
interventions implemented by the leaders of the organizations represented by the research
participants. In order to determine applicability outside of the research participants, I
have provided the context of the research, in detail. This will allow readers to determine
applicability outside of the research population and will also assist in ensuring
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dependability of the study. No additional limitations to trustworthiness are expected to
have arisen from the execution of the study.
Recommendations
In alignment with the recommendations of Sheehan et al. (2016), the data
collected for this study was collected from across the United States, representing many
different types of organizations (private and public, high and low hazard) in different
sectors (service industry, manufacturing, healthcare, etc.) and across multiple
organizations and those which do not represent only blue collar jobs. Additionally, the
data was collected in the form of interviews from across the United States, representing
many different types of organizations (private and public, high and low hazard) in
different sectors (service industry, manufacturing, healthcare, etc.), to fill a research gap
indicated by Fruhen et al.(2013).
However, the data associated with my research is not correlated with type or
sector of the job in question. Therefore, I propose that future research completely address
the recommendation of Sheehan et. al (2016) and Fruhen et. al (2013), as it relates to
correlating the interactions of executive leaders (as observed by safety professionals)
with the type of industry or sector of industry. The results of this type of survey could
result in more direct guidance to executives, based on their industry.
Finally, future research should try to address the limitations associated with
transferability of this study. A limitation to the study is the transferability of the study
outside of the research population. There will be generalities that apply; however, the
study will show what was determined to be most effective safety interventions
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implemented by the leaders of the organizations represented by the research participants.
Therefore, I suggest that future research be conducted with a quantitative approach via a
method that can be distributed widely to a significant number of safety professionals.
Future researchers should utilize the trends identified in this survey as the basis for the
quantitative survey. Safety professionals should then identify their industry, size,
geographic location, level of “executive leadership” at the site and which types of
interventions are employed by executive leaders in order to impact safety culture.
Conducting future studies in this manner would allow for broader transferability as well
as the ability to see additional trends based on geography or industry.
Implications
Nearly 5,000 employees die each year in the United States as the result of
occupational injury. Approximately 88% of occupational injuries are associated with
unsafe behaviors which are a result of the safety culture that has developed within the
organization through the interactions, messages, and expectations of the organization.
The most consistent demonstration of safety culture and management role in
development of safety culture comes from the relationship with their direct manager
(Kozlowski & Doherty, 1989). However, organizations struggle with ensuring that the
safety culture of the executive leadership team is conveyed to shop-floor employees
(Antonsen, 2009). This is vital, as senior managers set the tone for safety culture within
their organizations (Pilbeam et al., 2016). Therefore, research was conducted into the
interventions employed by executives to improve safety culture, as recommended by
Bronkhorst, Tummers, and Steijn (2018).
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My research found interventions observed by safety professionals within the
organization that have been employed by executives in order to build a positive safety
culture for their organization. In many cases, these interactions were, in the perception of
the safety professionals, able to reduce unsafe behaviors and reduce occupational injury.
Reductions in occupational injury and death would result in improvements for employees
and the general economy as positive safety culture has been found to reduce death and
injury within an organization (Neal & Griffin, 2006) and influences positive social
change through reductions in the loss of life and loss of financial resources (MarucciWellman et al., 2015).
The social change that this research can drive is an improvement in safety culture,
leading to improved safety behaviors and a reduction in occupational deaths and injuries.
This improvement can be brought about by developing education for executive leaders
with regards to interventions and the impact on safety culture. This education would
incorporate the interventions identified by participating safety professionals based on the
interventions they found most effective at fostering a positive safety culture. An example
of information that could be communicated to executive, including focus areas, types of
interventions and specific actions is included in Figure 3, based on the feedback of
interview participants.

Theme
Focus Area
Engagement Executives
engaging with
employees

Specific Actions to Support
 Start every meeting with a safety message.
 Engage with employees on a personal level.
 Model the behaviors your want your team to
demonstrate.
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Executives
providing money to
support safety
initiative







Executives
conducting physical
site walkthroughs

Executives care








Lack of engagement
is obvious when
safety isn’t a
priority to
executives

Integration

Executive integrated
safety into business
operations

Trust

Not blaming
employees (testing
the system)

Attend safety committee meetings, participate
in trainings.
Participate in incident investigations.
Ensure availability of proper tools to do the
job.
Invest in internal or external hazard
recognition techniques (example: behaviorbased-safety programs, communication tools,
etc.).
Hire (and retain) the right resources.
Allow teams the resources to fix identified
and agreed upon issues, but follow-up to
ensure completion.
Conduct routine physical site walk-throughs
of the site/production area/lab. Engage the
shop-floor. Take only a small group.
Be visible.
Don’t hesitate to talk safety.
Communicate that employee safety is valued.
Demonstrate, via actions, that employee
safety is valued.
Engage personally with employees (show true
care/concern for employee safety, learn
names, etc.).
 Identify and eliminate even the perception
that job completion or cost is valued over
safety.
 Be cautious with a punitive approach to
safety.
 Be aware of deferments.
 Ensure your actions match your words.
 Address issues timely to ensure
employees report and continue to report
their concerns.
 Integrate safety requirements into
production schedules
 Support top-down and bottom-up safety
culture development
 Embed safety in every conversation
 Following an event, ensure all personnel
are ok and understand investigations are
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Trusting
recommendations of
safety professional

Ownership

Shop floor
ownership of safety








focused on preventing future events
(rather than finding fault).
Investigate events to true root cause, for
example, why was an employee even
asked to perform that hazardous task?
Then, identify design or maintenance
issues.
Support the purpose of design standards
despite cost and productivity impacts.
Stand-by and support your safety
professional.
Fund safety.
Establish limits for shop-floor personnel
power over addressing safety concerns.
Ensure consistency on your safety
message.
Hold employees accountable for safety
performance.

Figure 3. Actions to support safety culture development

Education presented to executives on this topic can help to develop a positive
safety culture in an organization, resulting in fewer occupational injuries or deaths, thus
positively impacting society.
Conclusions
Nearly 5,000 employees die each year in the United States as the result of
occupational injury. Approximately 88% of occupational injuries are associated with
unsafe behaviors which are a result of the safety culture that has developed within the
organization through the interactions, messages and expectations of the organization. It
has long been identified that management plays a role in the development of safety
culture, yet studies such as Bronkhorst et al. (2018), Mullen, Kelloway, & Teed (2017),
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Pilbeam et al. (2016), Fruhen et al. (2014 and Michael et al. (2006), identified a gap in
identifying exactly which interventions assisted in the development of a positive safety
culture. The purpose of this qualitative descriptive phenomenological research study was
to describe the effectiveness of executive interventions on the safety culture within their
organizations, as perceived by safety professionals. A greater understanding of how
safety professionals perceive executive interventions, such as words, actions, or voice,
may allow for improved development of training. The training could encourage
executives to practice interventions that foster a positive safety culture that reduces
occupational death and injury; a significant loss to a family, a workplace and a
community.
The results of this study indicate that more specifically, executives can influence
safety culture by the following means:


Executives engaging with employees



Executives providing money to support safety initiative



Executives conducting physical site walkthroughs



Executives demonstrating care



Obvious lack of engagement when safety isn’t a priority to executives



Executive integrated safety into business operations



Not blaming employees



Trusting recommendations of safety professional



Shop floor ownership of safety
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Through the development of education for executives on the interventions that
they could employ to improve safety culture and reduce injuries and fatalities, a
percentage of the nearly 5,000 employees lost each year to occupational injuries can be
saved. Leadership behaviors can influence safety culture development and decrease
death.
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Appendix A: Participant Invite

Dear Safety Professional;
You are invited to take part in a research study associated with the lived experience of
safety professionals observing the development of safety culture in their organization, as
impacted by the interventions of executives. The purpose of this study is to describe the
effectiveness of the influence of executive interventions on organizational safety culture,
as perceived by safety professionals
This study is being conducted by a researcher named Tami Walters, who is a doctoral
student at Walden University.
The researcher is inviting practicing safety professionals who have obtained a 4-year
degree, have worked in their organization for more than 2 years and who have at least 5
years of experience as a safety professional to participate in the study. The inclusion
criteria was established to ensure that only experienced safety professionals, who
understand and can identify the attributes of safety culture, participate in the study.
This study is voluntary. You are free to accept or turn down the invitation. No one will
treat you differently if you decide not to be in the study. If you decide to be in the study
now, you can still change your mind later. You may stop at any time. If you agree to be
in this study, you will be asked to:
 Review and acknowledge your rights under the informed consent process.
 Participate in an ~60 minute, Skype (or other non-contact interview style)
meeting to answer questions about how executives with whom you interact
impact the safety culture of the organization which you support. As a thank you
for your time, understanding the stress of your daily life, I’d like to treat you to a
cup of coffee (via an electronic gift card), as we conduct our interview. This
will ensure that you start or end your day on a positive note and will show my
gratitude for your participation.
 Participate in follow up questions via phone or email (if necessary).
No personal or personally identifiable information will be collected about yourself, your
employer or other employees of your employer. The questions that will be asked during
the interview include the following:
o How would you describe your interactions with executives and the
interactions of shop floor employees as it relates to the safety culture?
o How would you describe the safety culture of the shop floor employees?
o Do executive decisions regarding operational issues (such as changes to
the scope of work or response to operational events) reflect the appropriate
focus on safety? If so, please give examples. Do executive decisions
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o

o
o
o

regarding operational issues (such as changes to the scope of work or
response to operational events) reflect the appropriate focus on safety? If
so, please give examples.
Provide examples of situations in which there was a perception of
executive trade off/conflict between safety and production (e.g., there was
pressure to meet a schedule goal, but you or someone you know identified
a problem which would delay the work)? Have you ever run into a
situation like this? If so, what did you do? How did it work out?
How would you describe the safety culture of the executives on the
jobsite?
How would you describe the leadership style of executives?
What actions have been taken by executives to influence the safety culture
at the jobsite and what where the effects of those actions?

The benefit of participating in this study is that the outcome of the study could benefit the
safety community as a whole in the form of a greater understanding of how safety
professionals perceive executive interventions, such as words, actions, or voice of
executives. This may allow for the development of training and educational materials to
encourage executives to practice interventions that foster a positive safety culture that
reduces occupational death and injury!
You may ask any questions you have now. Or if you have questions later, you may
contact the researcher.
Sincerest thanks for considering volunteering your valuable time!
Respectfully,
Tami Walters

131
Appendix B: Interview Protocol

Participants: The researcher is inviting practicing safety professionals who have
obtained a 4-year degree, have worked in their organization for more than 2 years and
who have at least 5 years of experience as a safety professional to participate in the study.
The inclusion criteria was established to ensure that only experienced safety
professionals, who understand and can identify the attributes of safety culture, participate
in the study.

Method of Interview: An ~60 minute, Skype (or other non-contact interview style)
meeting to answer questions about how executives interact to impact the safety culture of
the organization in which the safety professional supports. If follow-up is required, it
may be complete by phone, email or a continued interview.

Structure of Interview: The interviews will be semi-structured around 7 key questions.
Depending upon participant responses to the question, additional, clarifying questions
may be asked. Similarly, if a participant addresses more than one question in a response,
that question will not be asked again.

Primary Interview Questions:
How would you describe your interactions with executives and the
interactions of shop floor employees as it relates to the safety culture?
o How would you describe the safety culture of the shop floor employees?
o
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Do executive decisions regarding operational issues (such as changes to
the scope of work or response to operational events) reflect the appropriate
focus on safety? If so, please give examples. Do executive decisions
regarding operational issues (such as changes to the scope of work or
response to operational events) reflect the appropriate focus on safety? If
so, please give examples.
Provide examples of situations in which there was a perception of
executive trade off/conflict between safety and production (e.g., there was
pressure to meet a schedule goal, but you or someone you know identified
a problem which would delay the work)? Have you ever run into a
situation like this? If so, what did you do? How did it work out?
How would you describe the safety culture of the executives on the
jobsite?
How would you describe the leadership style of executives?
What actions have been taken by executives to influence the safety culture
at the jobsite and what where the effects of those actions?

